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ARTICLES
The Forgotten Link: "Control" in
Section 482
Wayne M. Gazur*
The foundation of international taxable income allocations between re-
lated parties is formed by the imposition of an arm's length standard. The
presence of "control" over a person invokes this measure. The author
examines the implications of control presented by continuing develop-
ments in the global business environment, including the rise of cooperative
interfirm arrangements.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing globalization of commercial activity,' compe-
tition among sovereigns for the international business tax base will
* Associate Professor of Business and Law, University of Colorado at Boulder. The author
gratefully acknowledges the valuable research assistance of Jack R. Saffell, a student at the Uni-
versity of Colorado School of Law.
I "Foreign direct investment from OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation & De-
velopment] countries increased four fold in the 1980s and grew much more rapidly than domes-
tic capital formation, GDP [Gross Domestic Product] or world trade." ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT:. POLICIES
AND TRENDS IN THE 1980S 11 (1990). For one of the many articles describing the globalization
phenomenon, see Bill Saporito, Where the Global Action Is, FORTUNE, Special Issue Autumn/
Winter 1993, at 63. The opening lines of the article demonstrate how "globalization" has be-
come a clich6. "Globalization. Aren't we sick of it? Haven't we heard enough already... ?" Id.
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surely increase,2 placing more pressure on structural allocation mech-
anisms. For the United States and other members of the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),3 the principal
income and expense allocation measure in establishing prices for
transactions between different business units of related taxpayers is
the imposition of an arm's length standard of valuation. That arm's
length standard is the foundation on which section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code is based.4
There is already abundant literature wrestling with interpreta-
tions of the arm's length standard.5 This article instead addresses the
2 For a discussion of international tax dispute resolution using treaty mechanisms and other
measures, see Robert G. Clark, Comment, Transfer Pricing, Section 482, and International Tax
Conflict: Getting Harmonized Income Allocation Measures from Multinational Cacophony, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1155 (1993). The conflict is not limited to competing industrialized countries.
The United Nations has been active in urging the adoption of uniform tax treaties, international
tax agreements, and the enforcement of the arm's length standard of pricing intrafirm transfers,
to aid the less-developed countries (LDCs) whose tax systems are seen as subject to extreme
manipulation by the transfer pricing practices of large multinational enterprises. "Whatever the
technicalities of taxation are, the public perception is that the MNCs [multinational corpora-
tions] are tax avoiders. This is an issue over which the governments of the industrialized as well
as the LDCs readily agree. The United Nations, on behalf of the LDCs, urges the conclusion of
either uniform bilateral tax treaties or an international tax agreement." Leslie E. Grayson, The
Means of Regulation of Multinational Corporations; The Developing Countries' Point of View, in
THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED STATES MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION 135, 140 (Lee D. Unter-
man & Christine W. Swent eds., 1975). The decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Barclay's Bank Int'l., Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board, 829 P.2d 279 (Cal. 1992), aff'd sub nom.,
Barclay's Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994), upholding
California's controversial unitary tax scheme, could ultimately increase the tensions between
trading partners. Although the passage of the "water's edge" bill, S.B. 671, by the California
Senate at least temporarily halted British threats of retaliation and calmed the international
waters, a voiced concern was that a ruling against Barclays could tempt California to return to a
system of unitary taxation. See George Graham, In a squeeze over tax: The impact of a transat-
lantic dispute, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 14, 1993, at 16.
3 The arm's length standard was adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation &
Development (OECD) in 1977. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVEL-
OPMENT, OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFASmS, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION ON IN-
COME AND ON CAPITAL, art. 9, at 30 (1977). The OECD was formed in 1960 to promote
international economic relations. The organization currently has twenty-four members primarily
drawn from the western industrialized countries, many of which have income tax treaties with
the U.S. The United Nations adopted the same standard in 1982. See U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L
ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DE-
VELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, art. 9, at 27, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102, U.N. Sales No.
E.80.XVI.3 (1980).
4 Internal Revenue Code section 482 does not contain the "arm's length" language. That
language is supplied by the Treasury Regulations. E.g., "In determining the true taxable income
of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at
arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(b)(1) (1993).
5 See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on the Allocation of Income and Expenses Among
National Tax Jurisdictions, 10 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L BUS. 409 (1978); James P. Fuller, The New
Temporary and Proposed Section 482 Regulations: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, 6 TAX NoTs
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largely overlooked role of control as a key to the application of sec-
tion 482. It will be argued that avoiding the threshold for control
found in section 482 could assume a position of growing importance in
the international setting in response to several developments in the
global business environment. First, American businesses are engaging
in more international strategic alliances, such as joint ventures, which
can involve a sharing of ownership and management. This is in con-
trast with the predominant wholly-owned subsidiary structure that ef-
fectively eliminates most control issues. Second, traditional concepts
of control may be stretched by foreign investment activity in the
United States (so-called "inbound" transactions) and foreign business
practices that are not amenable to the existing principles of analysis.
This article will first discuss briefly the rise of the strategic busi-
ness alliance as a supplement to, and in some cases supplanting, the
controlled foreign subsidiary and the introduction to the United States
of foreign business organizations such as the Japanese keiretsu. That
discussion will be followed by an exposition of the existing law defin-
ing control for purposes of section 482. The paper will then conclude
with an assessment of the prospects for modifying the control
standard.
II. GLOBAL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Rise of Alternatives to the Wholly-Owned Subsidiary
The predominant business structure for foreign direct investment
by United States multinational enterprises6 has been and remains the
wholly-owned subsidiary.7 Based on his research, one commentator
Irr'L 525 (Mar. 1, 1993); Josh 0. Ungerman, The White Paper: The Stealth Bomber of the Sec-
tion 482 Arsenal, 42 Sw. L.J. 1107 (1989); Richard L. Kaplan, International Tax Enforcement and
the Special Challenge of Transfer Pricing, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 299; George N. Carlson et al.,
Deja Vu All Over Again. The New Section 482 Regulations, 93 TAX Norms INT'L 21-11 (Feb. 2,
1993).
6 I use the term "multinational enterprise" simply to refer to a business enterprise (corpo-
rate, partnership, or otherwise) that does business in several countries. One can find much finer
distinctions based on other factors like the domicile of the entity or its owners. For a general
discussion of the debate over labels such as "international," "transnational," "global," "plurina-
tional," or "supranational." See C'TIrmA DAY WALLACE, LEOAL CONTROL OF THE MJLTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISE 10-13 (1983).
7 Using information collected by the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corpo-
rations from data supplied by the Harvard Multinational Project, Professor Peter J. Buckley
noted "the drift away from wholy-owned [sic] subsidiaries as means of technology transfer by
multinational firms." Peter J. Buckley, New Forms of International Industrial Co-operation, in
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF Tm MULTINATIONAL ENTEmRPisE 39,40 (Peter J. Buckley & Mark
Casson eds., 1985). The information discloses that with respect to the affiliates of 180 United
States based corporations in developing countries, the percentage of corporations operating as
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has concluded that the wholly-owned subsidiary's predominance will
not significantly decline in the foreseeable future.' This view is given
support by the observed preference of companies for the control of-
fered by the wholly-owned subsidiary in the efficient, internalized ex-
ploitation of assets, particularly those involving high level technology. 9
wholly-owned (over 95 percent) corporations was 58A percent, 44.5 percent, 37.4 percent, 46.2
percent and 43.7 percent for operations established before 1951, 1951-60, 1961-5, 1965-70, and
1971-5, respectively. Id. The same data indicates that co-owned (50:50) and minority-owned (5-
50 percent) affiliates for the same years increased in importance, comprising 16.8 percent, 26.7
percent, 33.1 percent, 32.7 percent, and 38.5 percent, respectively of the new business operations.
Id. The same data also demonstrates a much reduced reliance on the wholly-owned subsidiary
by European-based corporations. The Harvard data was repeated by the Research and Policy
Committee of the Committee for Economic Development in supporting the same conclusion.
"Transnational enterprises have traditionally preferred to establish wholly owned subsidiaries,
especially when operating in Third World countries.... [M]ost affiliates of U.S.-based companies
are wholly owned. Although this predominance has persisted since the early 1950s, a clear trend
toward an increasing proportion of minority-owned U.S. affiliates is discernible." RESEARCH
AND POLICY COMMrITEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND DEVELOPING COuNT-RIEs: NEW POLICIES FOR A CHANGING WORLD ECON-
OMY 33 (1981). "Companies that favor wholly owned operations in the Third World offer a
variety of reasons for their preference; the most important is the desire to Maintain centralized
management and decision making for the parent system. Other reasons include the desire to
avoid the dilution of equity returns, ensuring greater security for technological know-how, and
concern about pressure from domestic shareholders for quick returns in the form of dividends
when the firm migbt prefer to reinvest local earnings." Id. at 35. Ford Motor Company report-
edly followed a general one hundred percent ownership policy in its European activities "in
order to give freedom of action in its market strategy." J.M. LIVINGSTONE, THE INTERNATION-
ALIZATION OF BusINEss 77 (1989). Raw control of the foreign enterprise aside, a number of
economists have theorized that the multinational enterprise has prospered through creating an
internal market for certain inputs, like product information and research and development,
which would be subject to leakage or high transaction costs if exploited through market transac-
tions. The wholly-owned subsidiary serves this function well. "Production by subsidiaries is
preferable to licensing or joint ventures since the latter two arrangements cannot benefit from
the internal market of an MNE [multinational enterprise]. They would therefore dissipate the
information monopoly of the MNE, unless foreign markets were segmented by effective interna-
tional patent laws or other protective devices." ALAN M. RUGMAN, INSIDE THE MULTINATION-
ALs 42 (1981). This short footnote cannot even adequately list the numerous competing theories
of international production and business, labeled as Marxist, neo-classical, eclectic, and so forth.
For a summary of the theories and an evaluation, see GRAZIA IE-To-GILLIES, INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCrION (1992).
8 "[T]here is no reason to expect that there will be marked changes in ownership prefer-
ences on the part of U.S. manufacturing [multinational corporations] in the foreseeable future."
Stephen F. Kobrin, Trends in Ownership of U.S. Manufacturing Subsidiaries in Developing
Countries: An Interindustry Analysis, in CooPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL Busi-
NESS 129, 140 (Farok J. Contractor & Peter Lorange eds., 1988).
9 "Technology, marketing, and global integration are at the core of most explanations of
ownership preferences.... [T]o the extent that technology matures, for example, one would
expect preferences for sole ownership to decline.... [T]he technological intensity and degree of
global integration of many industries appear to be increasing, which should result in continued,
or even increased, pressure for sole ownership." Id. "In many high technology industries, strate-
gic flexibility and the desire to remove bureaucratic interference have favored majority control
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Indeed, the propensity for joint ventures is uneven and varies from
industry to industry corresponding, in part, to the presence of assets
that "generate a return to unambiguous control."'10
Although the wholly-owned subsidiary clearly remains important,
other writers have suggested that it will be supplemented increasingly
by interfirm cooperative alternatives such as joint ventures, minority
ownership stakes, licensing, and subcontracting arrangements." That
prediction has been confirmed by recent reports that United States
company activity in international joint ventures has increased
significantly.'
There are a number of factors that have been offered to explain
the apparent increase in cooperative activity. While there is a world-
wide move toward free-trade zones and blocs, outsiders may still suf-
fer penalties and handicaps. If these impediments that favor the
"home teams" can be avoided by an alignment with a local company,
the desirability of an affiliation is increased. 13  "The attractions of
over 50:50 partnerships." Karen F. Hadlik, R&D and International Joint Ventures, in COOPERA-
TIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BusNEss, supra note 8, at 187, 192.
10 Kobrin, supra note 8, at 135.
11 See generally Buckley, supra note 7, at 39.
12 Based on a number of sources, including United Nations data, one commentator has ob-
served that "[t]ransnational joint ventures have been increasing, particularly in [less-developed
countries] and Eastern Europe." IE'rro-GILuES, supra note 7, at 31. There also was "[a] general
increase in [joint ventures] throughout the world ... [and] a very considerable increase in [joint
ventures] between partners from major developed countries between 1975 and 1986." Id. at 32.
"In recent years there has been an explosion in the number of foreign operations structured as
joint ventures. The growth has been driven almost exclusively by nontax factors." Bruce N.
Davis & Steven R. Lainoff, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Joint Ventures, 46 TAX L. REV. 165, 167
(1991). "Lawyers say that while there are no hard numbers, there seem to be more joint ven-
tures in the high-tech area and overseas." Claudia MacLachlan, Joint Ventures Link Countries,
Technologies; Blurring Boundaries, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 12, 1994 at Al.
13 The investment laws of some host countries require participation by a domestic investor,
and subsidiaries wholly-owned by foreign-based companies are not permitted. These restrictions
are most often imposed by developing countries. See generally ROBERT BLACK ET AL., MUL-
TINATIONALS IN CONTENTION: RESPONSES AT GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS
48-51 (1978). For a more current summary of investment restrictions on joint ventures, see
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, JOINT VENTURES AS A CHAN-
NEL FOR THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (1988). "[I]n some cases joint ventures ... may repre-
sent the only option. For despite the efforts of the EC to create a level playing field for
takeovers across the community, there remain considerable barriers to entry for companies wish-
ing to make cross-border contested takeovers. Those barriers apply particularly to takeovers of
quoted companies, and they divide continental Europe from Anglo-Saxon financial markets."
Tim Handle, in Comm. of the European Communities, Panorama of EC Industry '93 (Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg 1993), at 51. "For example,
Western companies trying to do business in countries such as China or Vietnam find that joint
ventures are the best way to navigate unfathomable political and economic cultures. In other
countries, such as Mexico, joint ventures are the only legal way for foreign companies to enter
certain markets." MacLachlan, supra note 12, at Al.
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joint ventures for the multinational firms are time-unlimited access to
the market and resources of the host country, possible political prefer-
ment and a measure of equity control.' 1 4 The cooperative venture
can offer new technology opportunities but require less capital com-
mitment by either party because that burden is shared. In many cases
the joint activity can use existing facilities or infrastructure of the par-
ticipants. Speaking to joint ventures, plus contractual, non-equity alli-
ances, Professor Dunning has observed that "[t]he nature and form of
these coalitions vary but the most common reasons cited are those to
do with the sharing of capital risks and R&D costs, the acquisition of
complementary technology and skills, the need to capture economies
of scale, and overcoming entry barriers to new markets.
15
Business planning structures adapt to the challenges of the busi-
ness environment, and Professor Dunning has identified three key fac-
tors that have produced the rise of a "new-style multinational." The
first factor is the advance of technology and revolutionized production
methods that have both internationalized production and expanded
the functional boundaries of companies. The second factor is an ac-
ceptance, with some exceptions, of greater global economic interde-
pendence by nations. The third factor is an increased focus on the
most efficient means of production, which especially impacts the for-
14 See Buckley, supra note 7, at 45. However, Professor Buckley has questioned the signifi-
cance of such barriers to a company with international experience. "How far do the barriers to
entry to a foreign market decline as the international spread of the firm widens? Established
multinational firms have gained worldwide dominance and have developed techniques to 'learn
in advance' local conditions - products, processes, management style, marketing techniques are
continually adapted to local markets.... It is now only the entry into unusually isolated markets
... where heavy 'costs of foreignness' are still encountered. The advantage of locals in other
instances can be discounted in advance by an experienced multinational firm." Peter J. Buckley,
A Critical View of Theories of the Multinational Enterprise, in THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE, supra note 7, at 4. "Joint ventures are often related to involve-
ment in [less-developed countries]; the local firm (usually a medium-sized one) will have the
advantages of access to technology and managerial and marketing skills as well as to equity
capital." IETro-GILLIES, supra note 7, at 31.
15 JOHN H. DUNNING, EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION 330 (1988). One writer
has identified the following advantages of the joint venture: (1) risk spreading; (2) use of com-
plementary resources; (3) reducing competition in the market; (4) ease of penetration into a
market, particularly with a domestic partner, (5) easier repatriation of profits; (6) opening of
further possibilities in that country; and (7) flexibility as to equity share and with regard to the
effects of changes on the overall organization of the participant. See generally IETrO-GilLES,
supra note 7, at 31. There is not a shortage of lists of joint venture factors. "[T]he factors that
encourage JVs have accelerated - and continue to accelerate. These factors include ... 1. The
enormous (and rising) cost of development projects, particularly risky ones.... 2. Unprece-
dented joint efforts by nation states, particularly in Europe.... 3. Access to technology.... 4.
Access to markets.... 5. Access to critical mass." PRICE WATERHOUSE, 19 INT'L TAX REV. 1
(SeptJOct. 1993).
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mation of cooperative ventures. That worldwide search for efficiency
decreases emphasis on the single-product firm, and shifts attention to
intermediate products, the production of which involves more collabo-
rative work.' 6 The alliances or other cooperative networks may be
less formally structured than traditional joint ventures, and can take
the form of licensing or subcontracting agreements.'
7
A lot of overlapping terminology is used to designate various co-
operative relationships. As discussed below, the term "joint venture"
can refer to many types of arrangements, but generally the collabora-
tion is of a longer duration.' 8 The term "strategic alliance" is gener-
ally used in a broader sense and can refer to joint ventures that
involve the creation of a jointly owned entity, but also to cooperative
arrangements like licensing, franchising, and co-production. Some
writers have identified the latter arrangements as "contractual agree-
ments" in which participants commit resources to a business activity,
"but they do not share the ownership or profits of a venture."'19 An-
other distinction is that in joint ventures, the participants have rights
in the management of the enterprise.20 Joint ventures may be further
subdivided into equity and non-equity varieties, although the latter
arrangement can strongly resemble a "contractual agreement" in the
taxonomy discussed above. In the words of Professor Kolde, "[w]hen
the partners' rights stem from their equity participation, the enterprise
is classified as an equity joint venture; when one or more of the part-
16 "Most large firms today engage in a gamut of horizontal and vertical external relation-
ships, ranging from [foreign direct investment] to the most informal and flexible subcontracting
or service agreements." See DUNNING, supra note 15, at 332.
17 Professor Dunning has distinguished general purpose alliances (GPA) from so-called spe-
cific-purpose alliances (SPA). In the GPA, firms "merge their complete interests and/or set up a
new company to jointly supply an external market with a particular product or range of prod-
ucts." Dunning, supra note 15, at 338. The SPA may be on an equity basis or strictly contractual
in the sense that the "coalition is intended for a very specific purpose, the obligations of the
parties are clearly defined and ... it is for a limited period of time." Dunning, supra note 15, at
339.
18 In Professor Dunning's terms, the joint venture would more closely resemble the "general
purpose alliance." See DUNNING, supra note 17. "A joint venture is a business enterprise in
which two or more business entities from different countries participate on a permanent basis."
ENDEL J. KOLDE, ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BusrNEss 242 (1982). In practice the lon-
gevity of joint ventures is relatively short, much less than permanent. See infra note 74.
19 Franklin R. Root, Some Taxonomies of International Cooperative Arrangements, in CooP-
ERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUsiNEs s, 69, 71. Compare Unif. Partnership Act § 7
(4), 6 U.L.A. 39 (1969), "[t]he receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima
facie evidence that he is a partner in the business;" Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 202(c)(2), 6
U.L.A. 220 (Supp. 1993), "[t]he sharing of gross returns does not by itself establish a partnership,
even if the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in property from which
the returns are derived."
20 See Root, supra note 19, at 71.
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ners have made no equity contribution, the enterprise is a non equity
joint venture."' 21 It is not critical that we neatly resolve the confusion
in labels. Both types of ventures, equity and non-equity, will have
transfer pricing implications. As discussed in the last part of this pa-
per, even strictly contractual alliances may also present transfer pric-
ing issues.
Some notable corporate joint ventures have arisen through the
acquisition of partial interests in established companies. Effective
January 1, 1990, General Motors acquired a fifty percent interest in
Saab Automobile A/B, while Saab-Scania retained the other fifty per-
cent interest.' The Walt Disney Company has used several forms of
cooperative ventures in structuring its foreign investments. On the
one hand, the Tokyo Disneyland is owned and operated by an unre-
lated company, the Oriental Land Co., Ltd., and the Walt Disney
Company receives royalties for the use of the Disney theme.23 On the
other hand, Euro Disney S.C.A. is a publicly traded French company
in which the Walt Disney Company holds a forty-nine percent owner-
ship interest.24 As discussed in the following materials, these less than
21 ENDEL J. KOLDE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINFSS ENTERPiRsE 192 (2d ed. 1973), quoted in
WALLACE, supra note 6, at 16. The terminology does not present clear lines of differentiation
among joint ventures, in the nature of a partnership, and long-term contracts between independ-
ent parties to cooperate in some, often discrete, endeavor. "'Contract' joint ventures may be
distinguished from 'equity' joint ventures. Contract joint ventures generally do not involve the
formation of a separate corporate or partnership entity to which assets are contributed. While
certain forms of contract joint venture may involve sharing of profits and amount to a general
partnership, most commonly a contract joint venture is synonymous with a 'teaming arrange-
ment' whereby two entities cooperate to carry out a particular venture either acting as co-prime
contractors or pursuant to an agreement to subcontract." Stephen P.H. Johnson, Negotiating
and Drafting International Contract Joint Ventures, in NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACnONs 303 ( Shelly P. Battram & David N. Goldsweig eds.,
1991). The type of joint venture is important in other contexts, particularly in European Com-
munity competition law where a distinction is made between "concentrative" and "cooperative"
joint ventures. See, e.g., Paul J. De Rosa, Comment, Cooperative Joint Ventures in European
Community Competition Law, 41 BuFF. L. REV. 993 (1993); Alyssa A. Grikscheit, Note, Are We
Compatible?: Current European Community Law on the Compatibility of Joint Ventures with the
Common Market and Possibilities for Future Development, 92 MICH. L. REV. 968 (1994). Under
Chinese law different consequences flow from structuring investments as "Equity Joint Ven-
tures" or "Contractual Joint Ventures." See generally Gary J. Dernelle, Note, Direct Foreign
Investment and Contractual Relations in the People's Republic of China, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 331
(1994).
22 Investment Dealers' Digest Information Services, Inc., Mergers & Acquisitions Database,
Dec. 15, 1989, available in LEXIS, Compny Library, Compny File.
23 See 1992 Annual Report of The Walt Disney Company, pp. 19, 55 n.1, 57 n.6.
24 Id. p. 56. The Walt Disney Company reportedly has an eight-year contractual obligation
to manage the business and maintain an ownership interest of at least seventeen percent. Id.
Euro Disney completed a public offering of convertible bonds in June 1991. If all of the holders
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absolute ownership arrangements present significant issues with re-
spect to control of the foreign business enterprises.
B. Foreign Inbound Investment
Until about 1990, much of the focus of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (Service), and accordingly the developed case law, in the transfer
pricing area involved the foreign operations of United States compa-
nies. However, concern in Congress about alleged under reporting of
income by the United States subsidiaries of foreign-based companies
shifted that focus somewhat to inbound investment by foreign-con-
trolled companies, particularly those based in Japan.'
The amount of foreign investment in the United States is signifi-
cant and increasing by several accounts. For example, as of 1981, the
estimated gross book value of property, plant, and equipment of
United States enterprises in which one foreign owner had a direct or
indirect voting interest of ten percent or more had grown to $178 bil-
lion.26 By 1990, the estimate had grown to $550 billion.27 As a related
measure of foreign investment activity in the United States, Internal
Revenue Code section 6038C requires that foreign-controlled compa-
of the bonds exercised the conversion option, the Walt Disney Company's ownership interest in
Euro Disney would decrease to forty-two percent. ld
25 See generally Tax Underpayments By U.S. Subsidiaries of Foreign Companies: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On Oversight of the Comm. On Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990); Department of the Treasury's Report on Issues Related to the Compliance with U.S. Tax
Laws by Foreign Firms Operating in the United States: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Over-
sight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)[hereinafter Treasury
Report]. "In 1990, the focus shifted from the so-called outbound transactions to so-called in-
bound transactions involving foreign corporations and their U.S. subsidiaries." Statement of
Alan J. Wilensky, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Id. at 56. The outbound transactions, however, are not ignored. "In the early 1980s, transfer
pricing disputes largely involved transfers of tangibles between US parent firms and their foreign
affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions. Now center stage has been taken by transfer pricing disputes
over intangibles involving US parents and their foreign affiliates." GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER
(wrrH JOANNA M. VAN Roou), U.S. TAXATON OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME - BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 111 (1992). See generally Masahiro Max Yoshimura, Comment, The "Tax War" Be-
tween the United States and Japan under Internal Revenue Code § 482: Is There a Solution?, 12
WIs. INT'L L.J. 401 (1994).
26 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, May 1992, and Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States, Operations of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companies,
Preliminary 1990 Estimates, reprinted in STATISTICAL AasTRAcr OF T'rE UNITED STATES 1993
(113th Ed.) No. 1335 at 799. The "United States" for this purpose eicludes Puerto Rico and
other territories.
27 Id. It, however, has been observed that the rate of Japanese investment has been declin-
ing, perhaps reflecting, in part, a shift in emphasis to the emerging markets in the Pacific Rim
and eastern Europe. See P. James Schumacher, Jr., Comment, Legal Disincentives to Japanese
Direct Investment in the United States, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. Rv. 441 (1994).
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nies file reports with the Internal Revenue Service. For this purpose,
control is defined as ownership of at least twenty-five percent of the
stock of the company.2" As of 1989, approximately 45,000 companies
operating in the United States fell into this category. 29
When foreign-based companies invest in the United States, they
do so in the context of the United States business environment, but
also with reference to unique aspects of their home country. "In some
countries, e.g., in the US - the terms of the relationship may be for-
mally codified in a legally binding contract; in others, notably, e.g. Ja-
pan, though no less binding, the ties may take the form of a moral
commitment or a relationship based on forbearance, trust, reputation
building and allegiance to group values."30 A developing issue is
whether established United States principles of determining the con-
trol over, or other relatedness, of business entities can be applied ef-
fectively to businesses based on other legal and cultural assumptions.
A popular example is the Japanese horizontal keiretsu, in which con-
trol is wielded by a number of companies with aligned interests, each
of which alone owns only a nominal stake in the company of focus.
As discussed in this paper, the informal, but nevertheless cohesive,
nature of the keiretsu does not easily fit into legally based control
models generally found in international business transactions.
A recent report prepared by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development found that small and medium sized firms,
particularly those from Japan, are beginning to increase their share of
foreign direct investment, although large corporations still dominate
international investment.3' These smaller enterprises were defined as
firms with fewer than five hundred employees in the home country.
The data does not indicate the degree of family ownership of these
28 For purposes of section 6038C reporting, a corporation is twenty-five percent foreign-
owned if "at least 25 percent of - (A) the total voting power of all classes of stock of such
corporation entitled to vote, or (B) the total value of all classes of stock of such corporation, is
owned at any time during the taxable year by 1 foreign person." I.R.C. § 6038A(c)(1) (1988).
29 According to Internal Revenue Service statistics, 71.7 percent of foreign-controlled corpo-
rations paid no Federal income tax, and the Service placed the absolute number of such non-
paying corporations at 32,135, which produces an estimate of 44,818 foreign-controlled corpora-
tions in total. Responses of the Internal Revenue Service to Questions Q. I.E. and Q. 1.F. posed
in Letter of Honorable J.J. Pickle to Shirley D. Peterson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(March 23, 1992), reprinted in Treasury Report, supra note 24, at 139. The 44,818 total computed
above is roughly equivalent to the 46,000 amount for "foreign firms operating in the U.S." noted
by Mr. Pickle in his opening statement before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House
Ways and Means Committee on April 9, 1992. Treasury Report, supra note 24, at 7.
30 See DUNNING, supra note 15, at 337.
31 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Programme on Transnational
Corporations, Small and Medium-sized Transnational Corporations (1993).
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firms, but one might speculate that the degree of family ownership
could be greater than that in larger corporations.3 2 Moreover, it has
been suggested that a relative handful of families control even major
corporations.3 3 If a trend develops toward inbound or global invest-
ments by family groups, it may present new challenges to a system
that is accustomed, at least in the international transfer pricing con-
text, to dealing with the highly visible and disclosed arrangements of
publicly held companies. 4 This article will now review the existing
law defining "control" in the context of transfer pricing.
Ill. THm ROLE OF CONTROL IN TRANSFER PRICING
A. "Control" in the Internal Revenue Code
The pages of the Internal Revenue Code are replete with provi-
sions linking certain consequences to prescribed degrees of ownership
or control. In some cases the consequences of meeting such thresh-
olds are favorable to the taxpayer.35 In other cases the ownership or
32 In the debate of the North American Free Trade Agreement between Vice President Gore
and H. Ross Perot, televised on the Cable News Network on November 9, 1993, Mr. Perot in
referring to Mexico asserted that "[t]hirty-six families own over half the country." Larry King
Live, Transcript No. 961 (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1993). He later repeated the charge.
"President Salinas went to the 36 families who own over 54 percent of the gross domestic prod-
uct and asked them for 25 million dollars a piece." Id.
33 In the 1970s, one author charged that a single family, the Mellons, had "known controlling
interests in at least four of the 500 largest nonfinancial corporations.... It seems as reasonable
to assert that the Mellons are only instances of a less visible but prevalent situation among prin-
cipal proprietary families.... [I]t should be understood that the same small proportion of stock
in the hands of such a family in a specific corporation carries different implications and potential
for control than when held by a single individual with no major resources and institutions to
buttress his position. It is known that a great number of related individuals may participate in
the ownership of a family bloc, utilizing a complex holding pattern to keep control concentrated,
despite the diffusion of ownership." Maurice Zeitlin, Corporate Ownership and Control- The
Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class, 79 AM. J. Soc. 1073, 1098-99 (1974).
34 The reported transfer pricing cases form a "Who's Who" list of large multinational compa-
nies. E.g., Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F. 2d 445 (Ct. CIs. 1979); United
States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617 F. 2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980); Bausch & Lomb Ina v. Com-
missioner, 92 T.C. 525 (1989); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 856 F. 2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988);
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252 (1987); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96
T.C. 226 (1991); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 323 (1990).
There is at least one international transfer pricing case involving family owned corporations.
See Brittingham v. Commissioner, 598 F. 2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979), discussed at infra text accompa-
nying notes 231-32. Also, in the controlled foreign corporation context, a separate but related
issue, the focus of the case law was often on family owned corporations. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 149-52 & 173-76. The Service has acknowledged that a problem exists in conducting
family group audits. See infra text accompanying note 204.
35 For tax deferred treatment of corporate formations, the transferors of property must "con-
trol" the transferee corporation. See I.R.C. §§ 351(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) and 368(c) (1988).
The tax deferred success of other corporate reorganizations in part turns on "control" of certain
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control requirement serves a neutral function in determining which
taxpayers will be subject to a particular treatment.36 However, in
many instances the ownership or control test is found in the context of
an anti-abuse provision, and the result is less favorable to the affected
taxpayer.37
In the United States taxation of international transactions, ques-
tions of ownership or control generally arise in connection with out-
parties to the reorganization. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(B)-(E) (1988). Several corporate liquida-
tion provisions are tied to degrees of ownership. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 332 (1988) and 337 (1988) (deal-
ing with liquidation of controlled subsidiaries) and 338 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (dealing with
corporate acquisitions for which taxable treatment is desired). The dividends received deduction
generally increases in amount with the degree of corporate ownership. See I.R.C. § 243 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992). An ordinary loss (rather than a capital loss) is permitted for the worthlessness
of "affiliated" subsidiary corporations. See I.R.C. § 165(g)(3) (1988). Certain related parties are
permitted to transfer property, at least for income tax purposes, at below-market interest rates.
See I.R.C. § 483(e) (1988). The privilege of filing a consolidated corporate income tax return is
available only for members of an "affiliated group." See I.R.C. § 1504 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
As discussed in the textual materials that follow, controlled foreign corporation status, although
posing some drawbacks, provides some advantages with respect to the computation of the for-
eign tax credit. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(3) (1988).
36 A number of sections allocate applicable tax credits, deductions, or other incentives
among related taxpayers. E.g., §§ 41(f)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (aggregation of expenditures
for research credit); 44(d)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (apportionment of Disabled Access Credit
among related taxpayers); 52 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (apportionment of targeted jobs credit);
179(d)(6) (1988) (apportionment of property subject to election to expense); 447(d)(2) (1988)
(status as a family corporation for purpose of farming accounting methods); 474(d) (1988) (small
business eligibility for simplified LIFO inventory method); and 613A(c)(8) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) (apportionment of percentage depletion exemptions). Professor Coven has divided the
affinity provisions into two principal categories, relationship provisions ("definitional adjuncts to
specific substantive law provisions that require for their operation a defined relationship among
two or more taxpayers") and attribution provisions ("used for the purpose of expanding the
scope of the relationship provisions"). Glenn E. Coven, The Affinity Provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code: A Case Study in Nonsimplification, 45 TENN. L. Rnv. 557, 561 (1978).
37 The anti-abuse provisions in which affiliation is a factor are numerous. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 267
(1988) (limiting deductions and losses with respect to transactions between related taxpayers);
269B(c)(3) (1988) (degree of relationship for finding that entities are "stapled"); 133(b)(2)
(1988) (denying interest income exclusion for employee security acquisition loans between re-
lated persons); 1630) (1988 & Supp. 1993-94 (CCH)) (deductibility limitations placed on interest
paid to certain related persons); 269 (1988) (disallowance of deductions or credits in connection
with the acquisition of control when primary purpose is evasion or avoidance of tax); 304 (1988)
(special treatment of redemptions made by related corporations); 453(g) (1988) (immediate rec-
ognition of recapture income on installment sales of depreciable property between related per-
sons); 453(e) (1988) (limitations on resales, by related persons, of property acquired from a
related person in an installment sale); 707(b) (1988) (limitations on sales or exchanges of prop-
erty between controlling partners and the partnership); 1031(f) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (limita-
tions on subsequent related party dispositions of like-kind exchange property); 1235(d) (1988)
(denying capital asset treatment to sales or exchanges of patents between related persons); 1239
(1988) (denying capital asset treatment for gains from the sale of depreciable property between
related persons); and 1561 (1988) (allocating the surtax and minimum tax exemptions and other
attributes among controlled corporations).
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bound transactions in which United States persons are the interested
participants. In that regard, potential status as a "controlled foreign
corporation,"3" with its accompanying benefits
39 and drawbacks, 40
dominates planning and discussions of this area.4' Ownership by
38 Status as a controlled foreign corporation is determined under I.R.C. § 957(a), which pro-
vides that a foreign corporation is a "controlled foreign corporation" if more than 50 percent of:
(a) the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such corporation entitled to vote; or
(b) the total value of the stock of such corporation, is owned by United States shareholders. For
this purpose, attribution rules apply. See I.R.C. § 958 (1993). Also, a "United States share-
holder" means a United States person who owns a threshold stake in the corporation of ten
percent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote. See
I.R.C. § 951(b) (1988). The American Law Institute has proposed that the test be modified to
include as a controlled foreign corporation, a foreign corporation if more than fifty percent of
the voting power of its stock is owned by one or more United States persons, each of whom owns
at least ten percent of the voting power of such stock, or forty-five percent of the voting power of
such stock is so owned and it is not established to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that
effective control of the corporation is exercised by (or only in conjunction with) other persons
who are not United States persons and are independent of such persons. AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME
TAXATION 239 (1987).
39 The primary benefit of controlled foreign corporation status is that dividends, interest,
rents and royalties received by the United States parent from the foreign subsidiary are charac-
terized, for purposes of the foreign tax credit "baskets," in accordance with the nature of the
underlying income of the controlled foreign corporation. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(3) (1988). If the
controlled foreign corporation is engaged in active business activities, otherwise passive divi-
dends, interest, rents, and royalties paid by the corporation will be treated as general limitation
income in the hands of the parent company. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(I) (1988). For the purposes
of many international income tax treaties, the amount of reduction in foreign taxes on the repa-
triation of dividends from a foreign subsidiary is linked to the degree of ownership by the parent
company, albeit at a low threshold. In the 1981 Model Treaty, for example, the tax on dividends
is reduced from 15 percent of the gross dividends to 5 percent of the gross dividends, where "the
beneficial owner is a company which owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock of the company
paying the dividends." U.S. Treasury, 1981 Model Treaty, Article 10, 2 (June 16, 1981), re-
printed in sec. 211 Tax Treaties 10,573, 10,577 (1981).
40 Controlled foreign corporation status is the key to application of several anti-abuse provi-
sions. The central provision is I.R.C. § 951, which requires current inclusion of "Subpart F in-
come" by United States shareholders of controlled foreign corporations, irrespective of whether
earnings are in fact repatriated. Upon a sale of stock in a controlled foreign corporation, capital
asset treatment is denied with respect to a portion of the gain tied to the earnings and profits of
the corporation. See I.R.C. § 1248 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Controlled foreign corporation sta-
tus and the current inclusion of Subpart F income would be most detrimental if the foreign
corporation is domiciled in a tax haven, with no local tax payable, and the income in question
would not constitute general limitation "I basket" income to the parent for purposes of its world-
wide foreign tax credit limitation.
41 See, e.g., Donald R. Ravenscroft, Foreign Exchange Rate Changes, the Indirect Credit for
Foreign Tax of Controlled Foreign Corporations, and Revenue Ruling 74-230,30 TAX L. REV. 419
(1974-75); Roy Albert Povell & L. Frank Chopin, Operating a Buy-Sell Controlled Foreign Cor-
poration with a Fixed Place of Business in the United States, 1 VA. TAX REv. 215 (1981); James
H. W. Insley & Lottie Wolfe Cohen, Stapled Stock and Decontrol of Foreign Corporations: An-
other Loophole Closing, 62 TAXES 322 (1984); C. Richard Baker, A New Look at Subpart F, 54
TAXES 572 (1976).
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United States persons is also a determinative factor in status as a "for-
eign investment company"' or "foreign personal holding company.
'43
All of these regimes serve a common function as limitations on the
controversial principle of "deferral," which in this context refers to the
general rule that exempts from United States taxation the earnings of
foreign corporations until the earnings are repatriated to the United
States shareholders." Section 482 in the outbound context serves a
kindred purpose in limiting transfer pricing abuses that could expand
deferral opportunities. 45 These related provisions and their degree of
overlap are important in exploring the reach of section 482 because
they are an important, and potentially greater, factor influencing the
structure of international business vehicles.
46
42 A foreign corporation in which at least fifty percent of: (a) the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote; or (b) the total value of all classes of stock is held by
United States persons will qualify as a "foreign investment company" if it is registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 as either a management company or a unit investment trust,
or is engaged in, or holds itself out as engaged in, investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities
(as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940), commodities, or any interest (including a
futures or forward contract or option) in such securities or commodities. See I.R.C. § 1246(b)
(1988). A portion of the gain from the disposition of foreign investment company stock is
treated as ordinary income with reference to the corporation's earnings and profits. See I.R.C.
§ 1246(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
43 Among other factors, more than fifty percent of: (a) the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote; or (b) the total value of the stock of a "foreign personal
holding company" must be held by not more than five individuals who are citizens or residents
of the United States. See I.R.C. § 552(a) (1993). A consequence of such status is that each
United States shareholder must include in income an amount computed as a hypothetical divi-
dend of undistributed foreign personal holding company income. See I.R.C. § 551(b) (1993).
44 See generally Joseph Isenbergh, Perspectives on the Deferral of U.S. Taxation of the Earn-
ings of Foreign Corporations, 66 TAXES 1062 (1988). It has been proposed in Congress from
time to time that the deferral privilege be eliminated or significantly curtailed. See generally
BORIS I. B1TrKER & JAMEs S. EusTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 11 15.60[3] & [4] (6th ed. 1994). Total repeal aside, the inconsistencies in oper-
ation of the overlapping anti-abuse provisions have prompted the introduction of harmonizing
legislation on several occasions. See, e.g., Tax Fairness and Economic Growth Act of 1992, H.R.
4287, Subtitle D. For a brief discussion of the operation of the proposed revisions and citations
to other commentary, see BrrrKER & EuSTICE, supra, at 11 15.40[3] & 15.46.
45 The standard example is a situation in which the United States parent corporation under-
states the value of goods, technology, or other transfers to the foreign subsidiary, thereby in-
creasing the income captured in the foreign subsidiary that enjoys deferral of United States
income taxes. The example assumes that the operations of the subsidiary do not produce in-
come, e.g., Subpart F income, that otherwise creates an exception to the general rule of deferral.
It also assumes that for some reason, e.g., lax enforcement or "tax holiday" incentives, there is
not an equally or greater tax burden created in the host country.
46 See text accompanying infra notes 89-100. If parties are related for purposes of section
482, that opens them to application of I.R.C. § 1059A (1988), which requires that imports from a
related party be valued at no less than their declared value for customs purposes.
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B. An Overview of the Statute
The purpose of section 482 adjustments is to place transactions
between related parties on the same basis as that between taxpayers
operating at arm's length.
A transfer pricing problem may arise when ... transactions ... take
place between entities that are commonly controlled. Much as an indi-
vidual could write arbitrary contracts with himself, without affecting in
any material way that individual's economic circumstances, commonly
owned corporations could write contracts among themselves without
necessarily implying anything about the economic conduct of those
firms.4 7
However, in applying section 482 to specific transactions, one must
determine who or what is a "related party."
The persons subject to allocations of gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances under section 482 are "two or more organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or
not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated)
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests. 48
When first introduced to the Code in 1921, the requirement was ex-
pressed as "two or more related trades or businesses (whether unin-
corporated or incorporated and whether organized in the United
States or not) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests. 49 The term "affiliated" is not a general definition in the
47 Charles H. Berry et al., Arm's-Length Pricing: Some Economic Perspectives, 54 TAX
NoES 731, 731 (1992).
48 The complete section is terse by Internal Revenue Code standards. "In any case of two or
more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organ-
ized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indi-
rectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income,
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if
he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to pre-
vent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or
businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the meaning of
section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate
with the income attributable to the intangible." I.R.C. § 482 (1988).
49 Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, § 240(d). The provision permitted the "Commis-
sioner [to] consolidate the accounts of such related trades and businesses, in any proper case, for
the purpose of making an accurate distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income, de-
ductions, or capital between or among such related trades or businesses." Id. The legislative
history discloses the stated reasons for the new legislation. "Subsidiary corporations, particu-
larly foreign subsidiaries, are sometimes employed to 'milk' the parent corporation, or otherwise
improperly manipulate the financial accounts of the parent company." H.R. Rep. No. 350, 67
Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1921). "This is necessary to prevent the arbitrary shifting of profits among
related businesses, particularly in the case of subsidiary corporations organized as foreign trade
corporations." S.Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., Ist Sess., 20 (1921). In the Revenue Act of 1924 the
provision was amended to also require that the Commissioner allow such consolidation at the
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Code,50 and it is not specially defined in the section. The term was
added to the statute in the Revenue Act of 1928 when the provision
was removed as a subsection in the consolidated return provisions and
elevated to the status of a separate section 45.51 Presumably the lan-
guage was included to reject, in general terms, a threshold percentage
of common stock ownership as a requirement.52 On the other hand,
the otherwise undefined "related" modifier was dropped in the 1928
amendments and that produced a statute closely resembling current
section 482. 53 The focus today is accordingly on the phrase "owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests."
request of the taxpayer. "[T]he Commissioner may and at the request of the taxpayer shall, if
necessary, in order to make an accurate distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income,
deductions.... consolidate the accounts of such related trades or businesses." Revenue Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 176, § 240(d).
50 "Affiliated" is used throughout the Internal Revenue Code but is defined locally for the
application of specific sections. E.g., I.R.C. § 165(g)(3) (1988) (defining "affiliated corporation"
for purposes of the treatment of worthless securities); I.R.C. § 1504 (a) (1988) (defining "affili-
ated group" for purposes of consolidated income tax returns).
51 Prior to 1928, the provision was a subsection in section 240 which generally dealt with the
filing of consolidated tax returns. In 1928 the consolidated return provisions were redesignated
as sections 141 and 142, and the precursor to section 482 was designated section 45. The early
language, which was couched in terms of "consolidation," was changed to be an anti-avoidance
tool, wielded solely by the Commissioner (apparently some taxpayers had asserted that the lan-
guage permitted the filing of consolidated returns by a taxpayer, even when the corporations
were not part of an affiliated group) and "related" was dropped as a modifier of "trades or
businesses." The product of the 1928 amendments closely resembles today's statute. "In any
case of two or more trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not organized
in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
the same interests, the Commissioner is authorized to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross
income or deductions among such trades or businesses, if he determines that such distribution,
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income of any of such trades or businesses." Revenue Act of 1928. P.L. 562, § 45.
52 "This reference, however, is evidently intended to make it clear that § 482 applies to re-
lated corporations whether or not affiliated in the technical sense of qualification to file consoli-
dated returns." BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 44, 113.20[3][a].
53 See supra note 51 for a unified discussion of the 1928 amendments. In the 1934 Act, the
word "organizations" was joined with "trades, or businesses" in the statute. The purpose was "to
remove any doubt as to the application of this section to all kinds of business activity." H.R.
Rep. No. '704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 24 (1934). In 1943, the phrase "gross income or deductions"
was deleted and "gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances" was inserted in its place.
Pub. L. No. 235, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. The inclusion of this language was intended to create
symmetry with new section 129, which dealt with acquisitions made to evade income or excess
profits tax, the ancestor of current section 269. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess., 71 (1943). In 1954, the current language, but for two modifications, was adopted. In 1977,
the phrase "or his delegate" which had followed the word "Secretary" in the 1954 statute, was
deleted. The final sentence dealing specifically with intangible property was added by section
1231(e)(1) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514.
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1. Ownership
"Owne[rship]" and "control" are expressed in the disjunctive so
one could apparently apply each term in isolation. That approach
does not work well with "ownership" alone because the statute does
not prescribe a threshold ownership stake. That is, what constitutes
two organizations "owned... by the same interests" if the common
ownership is less than one hundred percent?
54
Although ownership and control will often accompany one an-
other, one can easily envision structures in which ownership and con-
trol are separated. The separation could arise, for example, in a
widely-held corporation with dispersed ownership in which no share-
holder holds a controlling stake. In that event, management could es-
sentially control the corporation without ownership." Separation
could also be produced through legal devices such as voting trusts or
irrevocable proxies. Some entities, notably charitable organizations
and mutual companies,56 will have no owners. Although section 482
easily applies to the one hundred percent ownership situation, many
business structures will involve multiple parties where less than one
hundred percent of the entity is owned by the putative controlling
party. In such cases, the determinative factor in application of section
482 will be the presence of "control."
54 There are a number of cases applying section 482 to one hundred percent owned and
controlled entities. E.g., Miles Conley Company, Ina v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 754 (1948) (sole
stockholder of corporation and sole proprietor of a business, both considered under common
control). All of the transfer pricing cases cited at supra note 34 involved one hundred percent
owned subsidiaries of a corporate parent.
55 The seminal work is the treatise by ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). The authors divided control into five
types: (1) control through almost complete ownership; (2) majority control; (3) control through
a legal device without majority ownership; (4) minority control; and (5) management control.
Id. at 70. Professors Berle and Means acknowledged that management control, which rests on
the passivity of the shareholders, is not permanent. "Even here, however, there is always the
possibility of revolt. A group outside the management may seek control. If the company has
been seriously mismanaged, a protective committee of stockholders may combine a number of
individual owners into a group that can successfully contend with the existing management and
replace it by another that in turn can be ousted only by revolutionary action." Id. at 88.
56 For the application of section 482 to a tax exempt organization and a municipal district,
see infra text accompanying notes 58-65. As discussed at infra text accompanying notes 89-100,
some comparisons can be made between control for section 482 and that found in section 957
dealing with controlled foreign corporations. In that regard, the temporary regulations inter-
preting section 953 (dealing with captive insurance companies) treat as a controlled foreign cor-
poration, a foreign mutual insurance company that "issues insurance policies that provide the
policyholder with the right to vote for directors of the corporation, the right to a share of the
assets upon liquidation in proportion to premiums paid, and the right to receive policyholder
dividends in proportion to premiums paid." 26 C.F.R. § 1.957-1T(c), example 9 (1994).
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2. Control
For the purpose of section 482, actual control of the entity must
be found and prescribed percentages of voting power are eschewed.
The regulations, in defining "controlled," state that it "includes any
kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and
however exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of the control that is
decisive, not its form or the mode of its exercise.15 7 The concept of
control, as applied to specific situations, will be explored later in this
paper. However, some general observations are appropriate at this
point.
a. Control Without Ownership
As noted above58 in many cases the controlling parties of an en-
tity will not own controlling ownership stakes, but that is not an obsta-
cle to application of section 482.59 There are some examples of the
extreme case, in which the controlling party does not own any interest
in an entity.
In Southern College of Optometry, Inc. v. Commissioner,6" the
Tax Court found that an organization owned by no one could be
linked with another based on common control. A husband and wife
together owned all of the stock of the Southern College of Optometry,
Inc., a for-profit corporation. They were also the president and secre-
tary-treasurer, respectively, of that corporation and two tax-exempt
corporations. The tax-exempt corporations did not have shareholders
and were governed by trustees, of which the husband and wife were
two of six. The husband received a salary as president of the corpora-
tion and as a teacher. Neither spouse, however, was paid any compen-
57 Treas. Reg. § 1A82-1T(g)(4) (1993). As discussed at infra text accompanying notes 89-
100, similar practical control tests are utilized in determining whether foreign corporations are
"controlled" by United States persons. A practical control standard is also utilized in connection
with the taxation of controlled entities of foreign governments. See Treas. Reg. § 1.892-5T(c)(2)
(1988) ("Effective practical control may be achieved through a minority interest which is suffi-
ciently large to achieve effective control, or through creditor, contractual or regulatory relation-
ships which, together with ownership interests held by the foreign government, achieve effective
control").
58 See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
59 With respect to controlling persons, Professors Bittker and Eustice have concluded that
there is no need for a finding of a pecuniary benefit from exercising a power subject to section
482 reallocation. "It does not appear to be necessary that the persons with control expect to gain
a direct economic benefit from exercising their power; it is enough that control is exercised in a
non-arm's length manner to distort the taxable income of the controlled enterprises." BrrrER
& Eus-icE, supra note 44, 113.20[3][a].
60 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 354 (1947).
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sation by the tax-exempt corporations, which paid salaries to other
individuals who held the titles of directors or deans.
The tax-exempt corporations occupied space leased by the for-
profit corporation from its shareholders. The tax-exempt corpora-
tions paid no rent to the taxpayer. The Service asserted that portions
of the lease payments, insurance costs, and compensation of the hus-
band as president were properly allocable to the tax-exempt corpora-
tions under an ancestor of section 482. The Tax Court agreed with the
government. It found that the suggestions of the husband and wife
were generally accepted by the other trustees. The apparent influence
over the trustees, coupled with the control over daily activities pro-
vided by officer authority, were enough for a finding of control, sup-
porting an allocation of expenses between the for-profit corporation
and "its commonly-controlled exempt affiliates." 61 It did not matter
that the controlling parties did not own a pecuniary interest in the tax-
exempt organizations; the statute does not require it.
There clearly was an improper income tax result produced by
permitting the tax-exempt organizations to occupy space, rent free,
leased by the for-profit corporation which in turn deducted all of the
rent paid for the building. The nagging question from a practical
standpoint is why the for-profit corporation's shareholders would per-
mit this economic benefit to be bestowed on another entity in which
they did not hold a pecuniary interest. They did earn a living from the
synergy of the taxpayer's activities and those of the tax-exempt corpo-
rations, but why not be more greedy? Curiously, this issue was not
raised.
62
The Tax Court again grappled with this question in Foster v. Com-
missioner,63 which involved a partnership owned equally by a father
61 6 T.C.M. (CCH) at 357.
62 The Tax Court could have responded as a matter of law that pecuniary benefit is irrelevant
to the inquiry of whether there was a distortion of income. See supra note 59. If the issue had
been approached on the facts, the Tax Court would have probably viewed any claim of crisp
compartmentalism in the overall fact situation with some skepticism. An increase in rent or
general and administrative expenses charged to, or paid directly by, the tax-exempt corporations,
for example, would directly or indirectly increase the taxable income of the for-profit corpora-
tion, precisely the Service's goal. However, if the common control were so absolute, the total
balance of wealth among the enterprises could be maintained, ignoring income tax costs, by
reducing other related party expenditures of the tax-exempt entities, like salaries. This assumes
that the proper amounts of the other expenditures are sufficiently pliable such that new section
482 issues are not produced. Perhaps the shareholders considered their control of all the entities
to be so absolute that although they forfeited some additional wealth in the short term, they
were confident that it could be recouped at some point in the future, the point in time being
within their control.
63 80 T.C. 34 (1983).
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and his three sons, a number of similarly owned "alphabet" real estate
development corporations, and a California municipal district, the Es-
tero Municipal Improvement District. The partnership was engaged
in developing a large real estate project. The special improvement
district was formed to help finance the project through its governmen-
tal borrowing authority. The district itself was also very active in con-
structing the project infrastructure. The partnership held certain
parcels until most of the expenses had been incurred, and then trans-
ferred interests in the parcels to serially formed corporations. The
maneuver was an attempt to capture the income from the sale of the
property in the corporations that were taxed at a lower rate than the
individual partners of the partnership.
The district was a quasi-governmental entity created by special
California legislation and had no "owners." The district was governed
by a board of three directors that was elected by the partnership
through voting rights appurtenant to the land subject to the district.' 4
The court first found that the partnership therefore controlled and
dominated the special district for purposes of section 482. The court
then attributed the development activities of the special district, which
produced the increase in value of the land, to the controlling partner-
ship, and consequently to the individual partners.
There are several cases that combine the courts' general skepti-
cism about the absence of control in family-owned enterprises6 6 with
fact situations in which a party is held to be a controlling person in the
absence of any ownership in the entity. In Pauline W. Ach v. Commis-
sioner,67 for example, the taxpayer transferred a profitable sole pro-
prietorship to a net operating loss-laden corporation owned by her
sons. The mother's business had been extremely profitable for years.
Nevertheless, she sold the business for its net book value, receiving no
stock in the corporation. The sons were not active in the day-to-day
management of the corporation, but they did attend meetings of the
board of directors and shareholders. The mother took no salary as
manager, and approximately six years later, after the net operating
64 Subsequent California legislation required that one of the three directors be designated by
the County Board of Supervisors. See generally 80 T.C. at 61. However, the partnership still
controlled the board because it could choose two of its three members. Id. at 165 n.79. In a year
following the years in question, the board was to be expanded to five members, all of whom were
to be residents of the community.
65 The taxpayers did not argue in response that the corporations, instead of the partnership,
controlled the special improvement district. This probably would have been futile because the
partnership owned most of the land subject to the district. See generally 80 T.C. at 169-70.
66 See infra text accompanying notes 211-35.
67 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F. 2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
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losses had been utilized and some related party loans repaid, the sons
returned the stock of the corporation to their mother for no
consideration.
The Service asserted that the income of the business was not
properly allocable to the corporation and instead included it in the
taxpayer mother's income, because she controlled both the former
sole proprietorship and the corporation. 68 The taxpayer argued that
she lacked control, because she did not own any stock of the loss cor-
poration. That argument was rejected by the courts because she en-
joyed control through her positions as chairman of the board,
president, and treasurer and as the individual responsible for directing
the day-to-day business activities of the corporation.
If control for purposes of section 482 is easily separated from
ownership of the entity, the opportunities for application of the stat-
ute multiply because it would seem to be easier to exercise control,
even if temporary, through a number of means where actual owner-
ship might be unattainable.
b. Temporary Control
Many forms of control are not permanent. Voting trusts, for ex-
ample, are often limited in duration.69 Control through the dynamics
of corporate governance can, be transient if produced, for example,
through management control by dispersion of shareholder owner-
ship 70 or minority control.7 '
If one accepts the premise that one need not derive pecuniary
benefit from manipulations of income or expense subject to section
68 Section 482 provides for allocations only among organizations or "trades or businesses"
under common control. One might criticize this aspect of the opinion for recreating the sole
proprietorship, which hadn't existed for several years, to be one of the two trades or businesses
required for application of section 482. The allocation of income to Mrs. Ach, individually, is
somewhat controversial if she were acting only as an investor, and was not herself engaged in a
trade or business. This is the familiar issue raised by the decision in Foglesong v. Commissioner,
691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982). See generally BrrrKER & Eus-rrcE, supra note 44, 113.20[2][a].
69 A voting trust generally is valid for not more than 10 years, subject to extension by the
parties. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 7.30 (1984).
70 See supra note 55. For purposes of determining control in the context of the securities
laws, one commentator noted that "[tihose who exercise control by the sufferance of those with
the power to control may also be controlling persons." A.A. Sommer, Jr., Who's "In Control"? -
S.E.C, 21 Bus. LAw. 559, 564-65 (1966).
71 "So long as the affairs of the corporation run smoothly, minority control may be quietly
maintained over a period of years. But in time of crisis, or where a conflict of interest between
the control and the management arises, the issue may be drawn and a proxy fight to determine
control may demonstrate how far dependent upon its appointed management the controlling
group has become." BERLE & MEANS, supra note 55, at 81.
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482,72 nor that the controlling party have ownership of the entity in
question, the conclusion follows that even transitory control will in-
voke the section. This point is particularly significant in the context of
ownership arrangements that involve a so-called "fade-out" structure
in which the stake of one participant is scheduled to diminish at a
certain point or points in the future. Such phase-out provisions may
be a required condition of the host country government.73 Apart from
scheduled transitions like the fade-out, it is reasonably well docu-
mented that joint ventures, for example, are relatively unstable and
most should not be expected to last for a significant period.74 The
control by one party may exist for a period that is shorter than the
period over which certain otherwise related party transactions will
take place. For example, a lease, promissory note, or license agree-
ment may still be executory long after control is lost. Based on sparse
case law, one commentator has concluded that the control relation-
ship "should exist both at the time the contract or loan was entered
into and at the time of the allocation. ' 75 This conflicts with the Ser-
72 See supra note 59.
73 "The 'fade-out' formula is a scheme that provides for the progressive transfer of owner-
ship and/or control of an established foreign enterprise into the hands of the host state or its
nationals and, as such, is not only a technique of control over foreign operations, but is at the
same time a technique of programmed disinvestment enforced by the host state." WALLACE,
supra note 6, at 244. See generally Buckley, supra note 7, at 49. In Alladin Indus. v. Comm'r, 41
T.C.M. (CCH) 1515 (1981), the taxpayer's wholly-owned subsidiary, Pathfinder Resources, Inc.,
was one of two equal partners in a land development partnership that needed additional capital.
As a part of the transaction, Alladin Industries guaranteed the partnership debt and Pathfinder
Resources, Inc. agreed to advance funds required to make necessary interest payments. The
existing 50:50 profit and loss ratios and capital account percentages were modified in favor of
Pathfinder Resources, Inc., to be eighty percent and fifty-five percent, respectively, until the loan
was repaid. Although the change was temporary and the partnership was returned to equal
ownership upon the loan's repayment, the taxpayers conceded, and the Tax Court found, that
the taxpayer and the partnership were controlled by the same interests. The court ignored the
fact that management of the partnership continued to be shared, with equal votes held by each
partner in management, including operations, and expenditures or investments in excess of
$1,000. The opinion is somewhat cryptic because it was a hearing on cross-motions for summary
judgment. The litigants apparently settled the case at some point thereafter.
74 In one study, the average life span of a venture was 3.5 years with a standard deviation of
5.8 years. "Of the ventures studied 42 percent lasted more than 4 years, 86 percent of them
lasted less than 10 years, and 2.6 percent of them lasted 20 years of more. Of the ventures that
were mutually assessed to be successful by their sponsors, 50 percent lasted at least 4 years."
Kathryn Rudie Harrigan, Strategic Alliances and Partner Asymmetries, in CooPERATIV STRArE-
GIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 8, 205, 207.
75 James P. Fuller, Section 482 Revisited, 31 TAX L. REV. 475, 485 (1976). The author based
his conclusion on an equivocal footnote in Cayuga Service, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 18, 24 n.2 (1975), and on the facts of R.T. French Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 836
(1973). In R.T. French, the Tax Court examined the payment of royalties paid by a wholly-
owned United States company to a foreign corporation that was only fifty-one percent owned by
the owners of the United States company at the time the long-term license was entered into, but
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vice's view of the treatment of executory contracts in another related
party context, i.e., gifts, in which the transfer is deemed to occur, and
the gift tax aspects are resolved, as of the date the agreement is en-
forceable, rather than when payments are made.76 Nevertheless, in
the absence of a planned or scheduled future change of ownership,
and in the presence of a contract that is not terminable by the party
against whom a section 482 allocation would be asserted, the original
arm's length dealings should be a strong factor in support of the
agreement's terms, even after a change in control occurs.
c. Contingent Control
It is probably a misnomer to consider the holder of an option to
purchase a controlling interest as having "contingent" control. The
that was wholly-owned at the time of the payments in question. The court looked at a number of
factors and was, in part, persuaded by the practical suggestion that one would not structure an
excessive payment to another entity in which one holds only a fifty-one percent stake. The agree-
ment was amended during the sole ownership period, but the amendments did not significantly
change the terms of the prior arm's length bargain. The legislative history accompanying the Tax
Reform Act of 1986's enactment of the last sentence of section 482, dealing with the transfer or
license of intangible property (see supra note 48), suggests that later revisions might be required
for transfer pricing purposes to arrangements that were on an arm's length basis when originally
negotiated. The "Blue Book" writers noted that "Congress did not intend ... that the inquiry as
to the appropriate compensation for the intangible be limited to the question of whether it was
appropriate considering only the facts in existence at the time of the transfer. Congress intended
that consideration also be given to the actual profit experience realized as a consequence of the
transfer. Thus, Congress intended to require that the payments made for the intangible be ad-
justed over time to reflect changes in the income attributable to the intangible." Staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation, 99th Cong., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
1016 (Comm. Print May 11, 1987). The Service has provided several narrow safe harbors from
such periodic reallocations in the applicable regulations. See, eg., Treas. Reg. § 1A82-4T(e)(2)
(1993). In Mornes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 317 (1982), a corporation paid an
overstated price for inventory purchased from a related party. At the time of the purchase, the
purchasing corporation was owned by two brothers. At the time of the Service's adjustment,
denying a portion of the purchasing corporation's loss on worthless inventory, only one of the
brothers owned the stock of the corporation. The Tax Court noted that there is no requirement
that the same persons own the corporation both at the time of sale and at the time of the reallo-
cation. See generally 43 T.C.M. at 333. However, that was a very cursory analysis because the
court then proceeded to find on the facts that both brothers in fact still owned the corporation.
See infra text accompanying notes 78-79. This is a different issue from the question being consid-
ered. The slight equivocation in Mornes notwithstanding, it is somewhat settled that identity of
the particular shareholders, for example, is not required. The statutory phrase "same interests"
does not mean the "same persons," and different persons can be linked over time by a common
goal, design, or purpose. For a discussion of this point, see Brittingham v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.
373, 396-400 (1976).
76 For example, in Rev. Rul. 69-347,1969-1 C.B. 227, the Service addressed the timing of the
gift in connection with payments made pursuant to an antenuptial agreement, ruling that the gift
arose when "the taxpayer became legally obligated to perform according to the terms of the
agreement." 1969-1 C.B. at 228.
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option holder may already have influence over governance, and there-
fore a degree of control, because of the potential impact of the op-
tion's exercise. 7
The potential ownership by a creditor created through a pledge of
shares as collateral for a loan can raise similar issues. Mornes, Inc. v.
Commissioner,78 presented some of those facts. An individual was
found to be in control of the corporation even after he had sold his
shares. Of course, the arrangement wasn't that simple. The terms of
the stock sale provided that there would be no transfer of the stock
until full payment was made. In addition, the seller retained the vot-
ing rights to the stock until it was conveyed. Because the selling
shareholder had retained the shares and voting rights as collateral for
the stock purchase obligation, the rights retained were enough to pro-
vide control because the purchaser did not own "all incidents of own-
ership"7 9 in the stock.
In other sections of the Internal Revenue Code the effect given to
convertible securities, at the pre-conversion stage, is inconsistent. For
example, the regulations interpreting the one-class of stock require-
ment for S corporations use a reality test that looks to the probability
77 At least one section 482 case included facts in which one of the parties held an option to
acquire stock in one of the relevant entities. In Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1970), rem'g, 51 T.C. 251 (1968), the taxpayer, Rubin, was a seventy percent shareholder in Park
International, Inc., and Rubin's two brothers each owned a fifteen percent stake. The corpora-
tion contracted to loan money and provide management services to another corporation,
Dorman Mills, Inc. Rubin did not own any stock in Dorman Mills, Inc., but he did hold a four-
year option to buy a controlling stake in the corporation, and, in the interim, held the right to
vote the stock subject to the option. The Tax Court upheld a reallocation of income between
Park International, Inc. and Rubin, individually. With respect to Park International, Inc.. the
decision supports the unsurprising conclusion that, in the absence of a corporate action requiring
a super majority vote, seventy percent voting control is enough to create control. The allocation
was not between Dorman Mills, Inc. and Rubin individually and that result would have given
some guidance as to the control effect of the purchase option, the voting rights, and the manage-
ment powers. In addition, at an early point in'the relationship, in 1958, Rubin apparently exer-
cised the option and actually purchased the stock of Dorman Mills, Inc.
78 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 329 (1982).
79 43 T.C.M. at 334. The same issue arises with respect to control for purposes of the securi-
ties laws. "Frequently creditors will be in this position [of a controlling person] as a consequence
of the right to vote the pledged shares as a part of the transaction, or because upon default they
have a right of foreclosure." Sommer, supra note 70, at 571. Compare Rev. Rul. 55-458,1955-2
C.B. 579 (stock purchased but held in escrow can be counted in determining affiliation for the
filing of a consolidated tax return; buyer had all rights to voting and dividends until a default).
"It is the right of ownership ... that controls rather than possibility that under certain circum-
stances nonexisting during such period, such right of ownership might be forfeited." 1955-2 C.B.
at 579. See also Miami National Bank v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 793 (1977) (stock sold to tax-
payer but still held in a "subordinated securities account" of the seller qualified as stock owned
by the taxpayer in creating an affiliated group).
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that the option will be exercised. 80 On the other hand, stock with con-
tingent voting rights is not treated as having voting rights for purposes
of the redemption provisions "until the happening of the specified
event."81 Some analogies also might be made to the treatment of war-
rants and convertible debt instruments as "stock" or "securities" in
the reorganization provisions where such instruments are usually de-
nied the status of stock unless exercised.82
None of the analogies to other Internal Revenue Code sections
works particularly well, since the setting and objectives of those sec-
tions are dissimilar.8 3 Two expressly "international" taxation provi-
sions do equate options with stock ownership, without qualification.
Section 958, which prescribes the stock ownership rules for the precise
controlled foreign corporation provisions, incorporates the attribution
rules of section 318, which in turn contain a rule that considers stock
subject to a purchase option as owned by the holder of the option.!4
Section 554, which prescribes the stock ownership rules for the foreign
personal holding company provisions, similarly treats stock subject to
a purchase option as stock owned.85 Moreover, subsection 554(b)
80 "... . [A] call option, warrant, or similar instrument (collectively, call option) issued by a
corporation is treated as a second class of stock of the corporation if, taking into account all the
facts and circumstances, the call option is substantially certain to be exercised (by the holder or a
potential transferee) and has a strike price substantially below the fair market value of the un-
derlying stock on the date that the call option is issued." Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(4)(iii)(A)
(1992).
81 "Generally, for purposes of this section, stock that does not have voting rights until the
happening of an event, such as a default in the payment of dividends on preferred stock, is not
voting stock until the happening of the specified event." Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3(a) (1955).
82 1 will not repeat the involved analysis. See BrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 44, 12.41[4].
83 For example, section 302(c) (1988) (dealing with waivers of family attribution in connec-
tion with redemptions that completely terminate a shareholder's interest in the corporation)
strictly prohibits any interest other than as a creditor, because the redeeming shareholder is
supposed to completely sever any equity relationship in the corporation, not just control. See
generally Michael D. Rose, The Prohibited Interest of Section 302(c)(2)(A), 36 TAX L. REV. 131
(1981).
84 See I.R.C. § 318(a)(4) (1988).
85 I.R.C. § 554(a)(3) (1988). In Rev. Rul. 82-150, 1982-2 C.B. 110, the Service ruled that an
option to purchase stock should be considered as stock for purposes of the foreign personal
holding company rules. Section 554(a)(3) would have readily treated the option as stock for
purposes of constructive ownership in determining whether the corporation was a foreign per-
sonal holding company. However, this would not have extended to section 551(a), the income
inclusion section of the foreign personal holding company provisions. Consequently, the Service
ruled that under a substance over form analysis, the option holder owned the equivalent of stock
for all purposes. The facts of the ruling are somewhat unique. The option holder paid 70,000x
for an option to purchase all of the stock of the corporation for 30,000x. The assets of the
corporation consisted of 100,000x. Because the option holder, as the beneficial owner of one
hundred percent of the corporation's stock, assumed the benefits and burdens of ownership of
the shares, the Service ruled that it was as if the sale of the stock had in fact been completed.
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treats convertible securities as stock. Both the controlled foreign cor-
poration and foreign personal holding company provisions are aimed
at abuses of the international taxation principle of "deferral."86 Sec-
tion 482 serves a similar function with regard to outbound transac-
tions, but it also applies to inbound transactions, as well as domestic
transactions, which raise other concerns. As exceptions to the rule of
deferral, the key stock ownership provisions are expressed at length in
the respective statutes; the section 482 control provision is not. It
seems that the common thread of international taxation impact is not
enough to weave the precise controlled foreign corporation and for-
eign personal holding company provisions together with the expansive
section 482 provisions, in view of the different objectives and styles of
statutory expression. The section 482 regulations' flexible search for
the practical "reality" of control would suggest that the appropriate
test should resemble that of the S corporation regulations, looking to
the objective likelihood that the option will be exercised. In that re-
gard, contingencies that are outside of the taxpayer's control,87 other
than the simple passage of time,88 might be given less weight, and vice
versa.
C. Cooperative Business Structures
1. The Controlled Foreign Corporation Connection
When United States companies do business abroad with foreign
partners in a collaborative venture, the parties will generally have a
number of dealings with the venture that have section 482 overtones
for the United States participant. The United States company may
sell or license goods or technology to the venture, and, on the other
hand, may acquire other goods or technology from the venture. As
86 See supra text accompanying notes 38-46.
87 For example, the option to purchase another shareholder's interest upon death, dissolu-
tion, or some other independent event should not be considered control until the triggering
event occurs. On the other hand, an option that can be initiated by the taxpayer, for example, a
mutual buy-sell, could have the effect of control if there were no significant impediments to the
exercise of the option. See infra text accompanying notes 169-84 (dealing with the courts' treat-
ment of purchase options and deadlock breaking devices in the context of the controlled foreign
corporation provisions).
88 Control that is deferred in time, but still a certainty if the taxpayer wishes to elect it, has so
much potential power that it could be treated as present control. Still, should the taxpayer be
deemed to have so elected if there are significant obstacles to, or a price tag on, such exercise?
The objective test of practical reality would mitigate the otherwise harsh rule produced by this
test. Professor Coven seems to adopt such a test for the purpose of proposed changes to the
option attribution rules, if one reads his footnote 295 as a significant exception to the rule ex-
pressed in the text of his article. See Coven, supra note 36, at 698-99.
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noted in the first pages of this paper, it appears that the importance of
joint ventures (whether corporate or partnership in nature) appears to
be rising, 9 and the presence of unrelated parties in the foreign ven-
ture makes the potential section 482 control issues more interesting
than those posed by the wholly-owned subsidiary that has been the
dominant vehicle for foreign direct investment. This article uses the
term "joint venture" broadly, in reference to a business enterprise in
which there is shared ownership. Reflecting the laws of the host coun-
try,g' and the ever present income tax structuring considerations,91 the
"joint venture" could take the form of a partnership, a limited liability
company, or a corporation. Joint ventures of a purely contractual na-
ture, like co-production or joint marketing alliances, are discussed in
the last part of this paper.
Section 482 issues are also raised by inbound investments by for-
eign persons in the United States, in dealings between the foreign
company and its United States affiliate.92
In the application of section 482 to these operations, an issue will
be the degree of control created by the almost infinite number of vari-
ations in the legal and practical structure of the relationship between
the parties. While there are several section 482 cases that give some
direction as to the effect on control of certain ownership arrange-
ments, additional direction can be found in several controlled foreign
corporation cases interpreting the control requirement of section 957.
Section 482 in its outbound applications serves to guard against abuses
of the foreign income deferral principle. Status as a controlled foreign
89 See supra text accompanying notes 6-24.
90 See generally Richard E. Cherin & James J. Combs, Foreign Joint Ventures: Basic Issues,
Drafting, and Negotiation, 38 Bus. LAW. 1033 (1983). The possibilities are even more numerous
in civil law countries and would include the corporation, limited liability company, limited part-
nership, limited partnership with shares, general partnership, and contractual joint venture. See
CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANS-
ACTIONS 1991-1993 742-44 (1991).
91 The principal issue is whether the foreign structure will be so-called "transparent," so that
income, losses, and foreign tax credits flow directly to the United States corporate owner. Char-
acterization as a partnership or branch for United States income tax purposes will provide this
result, if it is desired. On the other hand, status as a foreign corporation will generally eliminate
such immediate passthrough treatment, subject to Subpart F implications, but the deferral of
United States income tax on the foreign profits, until repatriation, will be gained.
92 A foreign person doing business in the United States will also be concerned with compli-
ance under I.R.C. § 6038 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (pertaining to the provision of certain informa-
tion regarding corporations controlled by foreign persons). There is some relationship between
control for purposes of section 482 and that invoking section 6038A. See David Tillinghast &
Karen Haum, Determining When a Foreign Person Is "Related" for Purposes of Sections 6038A
and 482, 4 TAX NoTmS INT'L 39 (1992). Inbound transactions are a recent focus of the Service.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
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corporation likewise can give rise to current recognition of income
from so-called "Subpart F income" activities considered by Congress
to be abusive. Control is a precondition to application of section 482
and application of the Subpart F provisions also turns upon "control"
of the foreign corporation.93
Section 957 is more narrowly drafted than section 482 with regard
to control. At the time of the litigated cases, control under section 957
was achieved only if "more than 50 percent of the total combined vot-
ing power of all classes of stock entitled to vote is owned ... by
United States shareholders."9 4 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 broad-
ened control to include situations in which more than fifty percent of
total combined voting power or more than fifty percent of total value
of the stock in the corporation is owned.95
The value prong appears to be largely irrelevant in drawing anal-
ogies for section 482 purposes because application of section 482 is
control, rather than ownership, driven. The voting power test of sec-
tion 957, however, is relevant to section 482, particularly because the
regulations reflect an almost paranoid examination of all aspects of
the voting power arrangement, much like the section 482 search for
indirect control, in determining "if in reality voting power is re-
tained. '96 A comparison of the control thresholds of sections 482 and
957 is also pertinent because the planning focus is probably on avoid-
ing controlled foreign corporation status with its drawbacks,97 or ac-
93 The control test was fashioned to preclude the indefinite retention abroad of the Subpart
F earnings. "[T]he power to compel distribution of that income strongly supports the equity of
the tax; and the voting power of the shareholders seems most appropriately to measure this
power." AMERICAN LAW INsTruTE, supra note 38, at 233-34. The statute further reflects the
underlying legislative assumptions about shareholder control over the retention of earnings of
the foreign corporation. A shareholder is not counted in the control group, nor subjected to pre-
repatriation income recognition, if a less than ten percent interest is held See I.R.C. § 951(b)
(1988).
94 I.R.C. § 951(a) (West 1993).
95 The American Law Institute recommended that the value test be eliminated because the
"decontrol" problem appears to be a limited one. See supra note 38, at 238-39.
96 "Any arrangement to shift formal voting power away from United States shareholders of
a foreign corporation will not be given effect if in reality voting power is retained. The mere
ownership of stock entitled to vote does not by itself mean that the shareholder owning such
stock has the voting power of such stock for purposes of section 957." Treas. Reg. § 1.957-
1(b)(2) (1988).
97 For a brief discussion of the disadvantages of controlled foreign corporation status, see
supra note 40. For a critique of the use of joint ventures to possibly avoid Subpart F income
status see Colman J. Burke, Can Subpart F Income Be Avoided Through the Use of a Partner-
ship?, 81 J. TAX'N 4 (1994).
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tively seeking such status for its advantages, 98 and tax driven
structuring would proceed in accordance with the selected goal. If
avoidance of controlled foreign corporation status will also negate
control for purposes of section 482, the section 482 control issue
would be effectively mooted by the section 957 planning. On the
other hand, if the interpretations of section 482 are more expansive,
the issue must be dealt with even after the section 957 aspects are
resolved. Furthermore, in some situations, achieving controlled for-
eign corporation status will be a desired goal of the United States in-
vestor.99 Because a focus of section 957 is on value, it would seem
possible that a United States corporation could hold more than fifty
percent of the value of the foreign corporation, attaining controlled
foreign corporation status, while avoiding control of the foreign cor-
poration for section 482 purposes.
There are few cases interpreting the control test of section 957,
and the area has been ably explored.100 Consequently, that material
will be recalled only to the degree necessary for making comparisons
to section 482.
2. Equal Voting and Control
a. The Common Objective Exception
With the emphasis on percentages of voting shares, director and
officer positions, and other indicia of control, a deadlocked venture
should be controlled by no one. That was the conclusion of the Tax
Court in Lake Erie & Pittsburgh Railway Co. v. Commissioner'0' in-
98 For a brief discussion of the advantages of controlled foreign corporation status, see supra
note 39.
99 In speaking to the structure of joint ventures in creating a controlled foreign corporation
that will produce general limitation income for purposes of the foreign tax credit (see supra note
39 for a brief explanation of this point), one tax planning pamphlet observed: "Fifty-fifty incor-
porated joint ventures ... can be transformed into 'controlled foreign corporations.'... In our
experience, a foreign joint venturer often will agree to its co-venturer having a few shares of
non-voting preferred stock to tip majority share-value ownership in its direction." PiuCE
WATERHOUSE, 19 INr'L TAX REv. 4, Vol. 19. No. 4, 3 (July/Aug. 1993). "The availability of
look-through treatment for CFCs ... often is so significant that the U.S. venturer will prefer
CFC status even though it means relinquishing deferral for subpart F earnings of the venture...
U.S. venturers sometimes will strain to achieve CFC status even if they do not have a greater
than 50% interest in the economic earnings of the venture." Davis & Lainoff, supra note 12, at
217. The temporary regulations provide a supporting example. Controlled foreign corporation
status was achieved when a shareholder acquired one additional share of stock from the other
equal shareholder, which raised its stake in the value of the corporation to 501 shares out of
1,000 shares. See Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1T(c), Example 8 (1988).
100 See generally Howard M. Liebman, Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Implications of
CCA, Ina, 17 HAgv. J. INT'L LAw 335 (1976).
101 5 T.C. 558 (1945).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 15:1 (1994)
volving the section 482 implications of the formation by two competi-
tor corporations, with no overlapping shareholders, officers, or
directors, of a third corporation, owned equally by them, which was to
operate a railroad system. However, in 1972 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in a case involv-
ing similar facts, B. Forman Company v. Commissioner.10 2
In B. Forman Company v. Commissioner, B. Forman Co. and Mc-
Curdy & Co. owned competing retail department stores. The two cor-
porations had no common shareholders, directors, or officers. To
revitalize business at their stores' locations, the two corporations
formed a third corporation, Midtown, McCurdy, which would develop
a shopping center linking the two stores. The two competitors each
owned fifty percent of the shares of the new shopping center corpora-
tion. Each of the two shareholders loaned money to the new corpora-
tion at rates of interest considered inadequate by the Service, which
invoked section 482 to impute interest income to the two sharehold-
ers. The Second Circuit noted that the judicial trend was to determine
actual control, "the realistic approach."'1 ° 3 In the pursuit of "realism"
the court applied a common goal analysis already seen in earlier fam-
ily control cases. °4 The court concluded that with respect to the two
shareholders of Midtown, McCurdy "[t]heir interests in the existence
and career of Midtown and the interests of Midtown are identical."'
10 5
At least with respect to this specific operational issue, the payment of
interest on loans made in equal amounts, by equal shareholders, and
by lenders with high levels of taxable income, the court was probably
correct; there were no conflicting self-interests.
Early commentary on the Forman decision noted that "[t]he
1970s promise to be an era for significant judicial decisions involving
section 482. ' '106 The Second Circuit's broad reading of control, how-
ever, was not aggressively pursued by the Service in its pronounce-
ments. Some years before the decision was rendered, the Service
indicated its non-acquiescence in the Lake Erie & Pittsburgh Railway
Co. decision and issued its position statemefit in Revenue Ruling 65-
102 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 899
(1972).
103 "The trend in the recent case law is to apply the realistic approach." 453 F. 2d at 1153.
104 See infra text accompanying notes 227-30. In connection with finding "controlling per-
sons" in the securities laws, "acting in concert for a common purpose" can aggregate the inter-
ests of several persons. See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 70, at 578.
105 453 F. 2d at 1153.
106 Stephen A. Nauheim, B. Forman & Co., Inc. - A Crucial Test of the Future of Section 482,
26 TAx LAW 107, 107 (1972).
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142.107 The ruling stresses that section 482 should have applied when
the two shareholders were "acting in concert, joined by a common
interest, and by explicit agreements detailing the terms and conditions
under which they were to deal with their joint subsidiary."' 0
In 1973 the Service had the opportunity to revisit the issue in a
proposed revenue ruling addressing the applicability of section 482 to
a corporation created to process and sell raw materials at cost to and
for its shareholders. One shareholder was to own forty percent of the
new corporation, and unrelated parties would hold the balance of the
outstanding shares in the corporation. The proposed ruling was modi-
fied to include only a one hundred percent shareholder, eliminating
the control issue. The General Counsel Memorandum explained that
otherwise it was just too difficult to draft an appropriate ruling be-
cause "[w]ithout considerable additional facts, no 'concert of action'
as described by the Second Circuit... can be developed." 0 9
b. Equal Control in the International Setting
Even under the potentially broad rule applied by the Second Cir-
cuit, one would assume that it would not apply to most 50:50 interna-
tional joint ventures. 110 Taking, for example, payments by such a
foreign-based joint venture to a United States parent company in ex-
change for the transfer of technology or other inputs of value,"' a
ready argument is that the United States parent would not un-
107 Rev. Rul. 65-142, 1965-1 C.B. 222.
108 Id. at 223. The explicit agreement could be provided by a joint venture agreement for the
partnership of two corporations or by a shareholders' agreement controlling a corporate joint
venture.
109 Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,375 (June 22, 1973). The proposed ruling was apparently never
issued.
110 "Although Forman suggests that even a venturer that does not own a majority interest
may be considered to control a joint venture if the co-venturers act in concert, this holding is
clearly of limited scope. Where the Service is unable to show that both co-venturers are engag-
ing in non-arm's length dealings with the venture, it should not be able to argue that the co-
venturers have acted in concert for purposes of § 482, and its ability to show common control
will be impaired." Davis & Lainoff, supra note 12, at 206. If both of the venturers were United
States companies, otherwise unrelated, both of which were transferring technology or other in-
puts to the venture, and both of which desired deferral of the United States income tax on
profits, both parties could have an incentive, and a common objective, to understate the price of
the inputs to the venture.
111 This argument assumes that the Service respects the structure of the transaction as being a
license or other transfer to the joint venture by the United States parent, rather than a transfer
by the United States parent, to the foreign subsidiary of the United States parent, and then in
turn by the subsidiary to the joint venture. Some writers have noted that the latter structure
could be required in view of other concerns. "Given JV constraints, it may be necessary to first
license the technology to a wholly owned foreign subsidiary that would in turn license the tech-
nology to the foreign JV." PiucE WATERmousE, supra note 15, at 5. See also Davis & Lainoff,
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dercharge the joint venture in which it holds only a fifty percent stake;
any potential United States tax savings would be offset by the eco-
nomic loss of the undercharge bestowed on the other party. 112 This
argument arguably suffers from an oversimplified, discrete," 3 single
transaction view of the parties' dealings. If there are other conces-
sions made in the joint venture agreement, at the outset or in fulfilling
the agreement, to compensate for a "sweetheart deal" on the technol-
ogy payments, the argument loses much of its force when seen from
an overall perspective. 114 It would seem to be a murky factual ques-
tion of directness and degree, but not an impossible task. 1 5
supra note 12, at 200-01 (discussing license of intangibles to a controlled foreign corporation
followed by a license to a foreign corporate venture to avoid I.R.C. § 367).
112 The principal United States income tax benefit would be deferral of United States income
taxes on the "profits" shifted to the foreign subsidiary through the undercharge. The argument
that a United States company would not shift profits to even a company owned fifty-one percent
by its parent interests, because forty-nine percent of the overcharge would spill over to outsiders,
was accepted by the Tax Court in R.T. French Co. See supra note 75. "Furthermore, as a practi-
cal matter, in the absence of a corresponding non-arm's length transaction by the co-venturer, a
court certainly would ask why a rational business person intentionally would shift profits to an
entity in which a material unrelated party owned a substantial interest.... [W]hile the presence
of a material unrelated co-venturer does not automatically preclude the Service from making a
§ 482 adjustment .... the presence of the co-venturer certainly raises the burden to a level that
the government rarely will be able to meet." Davis & Lainoff, supra note 12, at 206.
113 A joint venture contemplates a course of dealings and is a so-called "relational contract,"
as contrasted with a discrete, single exchange found at the other end of a continuum. "A truly
discrete exchange transaction would be entirely separate not only from all other present rela-
tions but from all past and future relations as well. In short, it could occur, if at all, only between
total strangers, brought together by chance (not by any common social structure, since that link
constitutes at least the rudiments of a relation outside the transaction). Moreover, each party
would have to be completely sure of never again seeing or having anything else to do with the
other." Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classi-
cal, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 856 (1978).
114 The other concessions would recoup the United States parent's "loss" on the transfer pric-
ing of its inputs, but the recoupment, in the form of increased profits from the joint venture,
would inure to the benefit of the foreign subsidiary and enjoy deferral of United States income
taxation.
115 Garbini Electric, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M (CCH) 919 (1982), is an example of
compensating one owner indirectly, to induce that person to enter into an enterprise. One
shareholder, Garbini, owned one hundred percent of Garbini Electric, Inc. Garbini wanted to
retain Gamble as a key employee, but, among other problems, Gamble didn't have the capital
for the purchase of a fifty percent interest in Garbini Electric, Inc. They consequently organized
a new company, Garbini Management, Inc., in which Gamble owned fifty percent and Garbini
and her daughter owned forty percent and ten percent, respectively, of the stock. Garbini Elec-
tric, Inc. paid a management fee to Garbini Management, Inc., which was paid out in salaries to
Garbini and Gamble. Although the new company was not controlled by the sole shareholder of
Garbini Electric, Inc., the Tax Court found that both corporations were controlled by the same
interests because the shareholders of both shared the same "common design for the shifting of
income." 43 T.C.M. at 926. This holding prevailed in spite of the argument that it was against
the immediate interests of Garbini to shift income from a company one hundred percent owned
by her to the benefit of a company only forty percent owned by her. At a later point, Garbini
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One would assume that in most cases the United States parent
company, on the other hand, would not, solely for United States in-
come tax purposes, seek to overcharge the venture because deferral
would be lost on the excess profits from the overcharge." 6 Moreover,
if one does not approach the problem from an overall bargaining per-
spective, the foreign joint venture partner would probably be much
more vigilant in resisting overcharges to the joint venture.
The national partner... wants assurance that the prices charged by the
[transnational corporation] are arms-length, competitive, and fair....
Provisions in the joint venture contract that the transnational corpora-
tion will base prices upon arms-length pricing, cost plus agreed margins,
or competitive international prices can help to deal with this problem,
but they do not guarantee a full resolution."
7
Electric, Inc. was dissolved and Gamble purchased one-half of the assets and joined with Garbini
in a partnership, with Garbini contributing the other one-half of the assets of the former Garbini
Electric, Inc. The management fee was a way to provide Gamble with funds to buy one-half of
Garbini Electric, Inc. In the findings of fact Gamble was characterized as the "backbone of the
business" and if Gamble left Garbini Electric, Inc., it "had no business." 43 T.C.M. at 921. The
practical reality was that if Gamble left, Garbini's overall fortunes would suffer more than the
loss of sixty percent of the management fees paid to Gamble and her daughter. The Tax Court
started down this reality track, but concluded the opinion with other reasons for Garbini's ac-
tions that are not as persuasive, including gaining an additional surtax exemption and solving
certain problems with the retirement plans.
116 This assumes that the joint venture operates in a taxing jurisdiction with rates significantly
below those of the United States. With many of the developed companies, notably those in
western Europe, the overcharge, if deductible for purposes of the host country taxation, would
result in a comparative tax savings through repatriation to the United States industrialized "tax
haven." Japanese firms are routinely accused of overcharging their United States subsidiaries to
lower any potential United States tax liability. At first glance, moving profits to Japan makes
little sense since the nominal Japanese corporate tax rate is higher than its United States coun-
terpart. "The 1988 effective rate is about 56A percent. For 1989, the combined effective rate can
be 54.07 percent, and for 1990 and later, 51.39 percent." MARC M. LEVEY, FOREIGN INVEST-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES 73 (1989, Supp. 1992). A number of explanations for the contra-
diction have been offered. "It is well-known that corporate taxes are sometimes negotiable in
Japan. The corporations may not in practice pay any Japanese tax on those profits. Or the
ministry of finance may have promised a big quid pro quo, such as special access to cheap capital
in the warrant bond market." Clyde Prestowitz, Jr., quoted in Eamon Fingleton's Japan: The
Gaijin and Gyosei Shido - Ministry of Finance's Guidance Works Against Foreign Firms, INsTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTOR, at 71, Reuter Textline, Oct. 31, 1990. "The reason seems to be intense
pressure, reinforced by the Japanese bonus system, for each division to show high before-tax
profits, regardless of the tax consequence for the consolidated group." HUPBAUER & VAN
Rooui, supra note 25, at 111 n.17. Another commentator rejects the argument that Japanese
companies would pay higher Japanese taxes out of national loyalty, and downplays the roles of
misunderstandings of the law and the argument that in fact Japanese companies do not pay taxes
at the stated marginal rates. See Joseph H. Guttentag, Transfer Pricing: U.S. and Japanese
Views, 94 TAX NOTES IN'L 25-14 at 20 (Feb. 7, 1994).
117 William A. Dymsza, Successes and Failures of Joint Ventures in Developing Countries: Les-
sons from Experience, in COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, supra note 8,
403, 413.
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The section 957 case law referred to earlier has not produced an
"in concert" doctrine to bind United States persons together. The
need for such aggregation would rarely arise because section 957 en-
joys statutory constructive ownership rules that would deal with many
family situations, for example." 8 Moreover, so long as a United
States person holds at least a ten percent stake in the corporation, the
stock ownership of all United States persons that meet that threshold
is aggregated, irrespective of affiliation, in determining whether the
requisite ownership by United States persons exists for purpose of
controlled foreign corporation status. 1 9 The case law's inquiry there-
fore generally focuses on whether a given United States person, or
related group of United States persons, have in reality more than fifty
percent of the voting power in the corporation vis-A-vis the other, for-
eign, shareholders. 2 '
3. Other Voting and Management Arrangements - The Closely
Held Setting
The section 482 case law, as well as the section 957 case law,
demonstrate a close scrutiny of the totality of entity governance ar-
rangements in determining whether practical control of the entity is
present.
a. Voting Agreements
The decision in Charles Town, Inc. v. Commissionerl2 is illustra-
tive of the recurrent theme that management control of an entity
drives section 482, and the ownership stake may be negligible. Two
brothers owned all of the stock of Fairmount Steel Corporation (Fair-
mount), which had significant net operating loss carryovers. The
brothers formed a new corporation, Charles Town, Inc. (Charles
Town) to acquire a West Virginia race track. A first cousin, and busi-
ness associate, received ninety-eight percent of the stock in Charles
Town, while each brother received one percent. The brothers became
the president and secretary-treasurer and directors of Charles Town,
while the cousin was a vice president and director. Fairmount agreed
118 See I.R.C. § 958 (1993).
119 See I.R.C. § 957(a) (1993) (a controlled foreign corporation exists where more than 50
percent of the total combined voting power or total value of stock is owned by "United States
shareholders" on any day of the corporation's taxable year); I.R.C. § 951(b) (1993) (a "United
States shareholder" means a United States person owning 10 percent or more of the total com-
bined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote).
120 See infra text accompanying notes 146-55 & 172-84.
121 372 F. 2d 415 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967).
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to advance funds to Charles Town to conduct racing at the track that
Charles Town had leased from the owner. Charles Town operated the
race track, retaining ten percent of the net profits, and paying the bal-
ance to Fairmount.
The court concluded that the brothers were in control of the
"business" of Charles Town and approved a reallocation of profits
from Fairmount to Charles Town. 22 The small stock ownership posi-
tion of the brothers in Charles Town was supplemented by a provision
in the management agreement that a majority of the officers would
make all decisions for the corporation so long as Charles Town was
indebted to Fairmount. This voting agreement, which gave the broth-
ers practical control of Charles Town, provided an easy path for a
finding of control.
[The 98 percent shareholder] gave up the control he could have exer-
cised as majority stockholder when he permitted Charles Town to con-
tract that the [brothers] could not be removed from majority control of
the Charles Town Board of Directors until the money advanced by Fair-
mount was returned. This was "the reality of control.' 23
Voting agreements may assure incumbency of directors and of-
ficers as in Charles Town, Inc., producing control.124 In other cases
the agreements can defeat control in creating a management structure
where each shareholder is empowered through the requirement of
unanimous agreement for corporate action. In Bransford v. Commis-
sioner,125 the Service argued that various groups controlled each of
two entities, a partnership and a corporation. However, both entities
required unanimous agreement for decisions, and the ownership inter-
ests between the two entities did not overlap to a degree that would
establish common ownership. The court therefore rejected an appli-
cation of section 482.126
122 In an attempt to defeat application of section 482, the taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that
the profit division agreement was a partnership.
123 372 F. 2d at 420.
124 Thie controlled foreign corporation regulations assert that control can exist even if based
on oral agreement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(c), Example 7 (1988). The section 482 regulations
also reject any requirement of legal enforceability. "'Controlled' includes any kind of control,
direct or indirect, whether legally enforceable, and however exerciseable or exercised." Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-lT(g)(4) (1993).
125 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1262 (1977).
126 Although each and every corporate action, for example, those in the ordinary course of
business, probably did not require approval, the two active 16.66 percent shareholders, Messrs.
Gree and Beal, acted at the sufferance of the other shareholders, who could seek to impose their
authority at any time. This is distinguishable from the facts in Charles Town, Inc., supra text
accompanying notes 121-24, where the controlling persons exercised daily management control,
backed by their assured director status. This result at first appears inconsistent with an example
in the controlled foreign corporation regulations. In the example, a United States person owned
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b. Fiduciary Duty
In Bransford, the court, in dealing with the motives of one share-
holder, observed that "it is equally unlikely that he would have ren-
dered himself vulnerable to claims by other .. . shareholders for
violating his fiduciary obligation, as president of the corporation, to
protect and preserve their interests."'12 7 The fiduciary obligation issue
is raised only in passing. Nevertheless, it is an intriguing argument
that state fiduciary law constraints may limit the putative controlling
shareholder's power to deal with the corporation in a manner that
would generate both a state law conflict of interest and an improper
transaction invoking section 482. Fiduciary law issues have on other
occasions been raised in connection with transfer pricing.'28 That set
of facts would probably present itself in many cases in which there
exists a truly unrelated minority shareholder group, and the income or
expense allocations are to the economic detriment of the particular
corporation in question, and to the benefit of another party, which is
controlled by the majority shareholders, but in which the minority
owners don't have an interest.
The issue could be posed in terms of whether section 482 applies
only to situations in the control of persons with both the power and
a fifty-one percent interest in a foreign corporation, and seven other members owned the re-
maining forty-nine percent. The memorandum of association provided for only one manager,
who would exercise the powers ordinarily exercised by a board of directors. The manager, how-
ever, was elected by unanimous agreement of all the members. The example concludes that
"[s]ince [the U.S. person] owns 51 percent of the company, he will be deemed to own more than
50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock .... notwithstanding that he
has power to elect a manager only with the agreement of the other members." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.957-1(c), Example 3 (1988). The key to reconciling this example with instances in which
control is avoided by requiring unanimous agreement for all actions is the scope of the man-
ager's powers. The United States person still controlled all other transactions, outside of the
election of the manager, for which a vote of the members was required. Compare Rev. Rul. 69-
126, 1969-1 C.B. 218 (voting power for consolidated tax return affiliation status is determined
with reference to power to elect directors).
127 36 T.C.M. at 1271.
128 The state law remedies for transfer pricing abuses were acknowledged, for example, in the
1984 "Blue Book" explanation of the I.R.C. § 269B stapled stock provisions. "Shareholders of
stapled stock may have had no business reason to complain if their taxable entity undercharged
their nontaxable entity for goods or services. If stock is not stapled, by contrast, the sharehold-
ers of a company can sue its management (in a shareholders' derivative suit) if the company
undercharges another entity." Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Reve-
nue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 455 (Dec. 31, 1984). Some state law deci-
sions have expressed an arm's length standard. "The essence of the test is whether or not under
all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain." Jones v.
H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969) (quoting with approval language of the
California Court of Appeal in an earlier decision in turn quoting from Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 306-07 (1939)).
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the right to act in some manner, or to those with simply the power to
act. There is authority in other taxation contexts, in particular the
estate tax, requiring the presence of a legal right to act, finding an
absence of meaningful power if the actor is subject to fiduciary obliga-
tions.129 However, section 482 is so strongly couched in terms of "con-
trol" that power alone is probably adequate. 30 On that basis,
fiduciary law constraints would not be a defense against a section 482
adjustment.
However, a related issue is raised by the decisions in Comm'r v.
First Sec. Bank of Utah 3' and Procter & Gamble 32 of what consti-
tutes the legal limitations on control affecting the payment of ex-
penses or allocation of income. 33  In both of those cases, the
129 In a notable international partnership classification case, fiduciary duty was a determina-
tive issue. "Thus, although we agree with the government that [the related parties] are likely, as
a practical matter, always to act in concert in their management of the distributorships, we can-
not conclude as a matter of law that their interests will never diverge. Nor do we think that the
tax consequences of a legitimate business transaction should turn on an unsupported assumption
that certain parties to the transaction will act in breach of their fiduciary duties and, indeed,
unlawfully." MCA Ina v. United States, 685 F. 2d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 1982). It is a well-estab-
lished principle of federal estate taxation law that fiduciary constraints that are an external stan-
dard, which a court of equity could apply to compel compliance by the fiduciary, can overcome
the existence of practical control over property. See, eg., Jennings v. Smith. 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.
1947) (statutory antecedents of Internal Revenue Code §§ 2036 and 2038 not applicable to a
settlor-trustee because discretion was limited by an ascertainable state law fiduciary standard).
The power versus right distinction, which turned upon similar projected fiduciary constraints,
was at the forefront in the much discussed estate taxation decision, United States v. Byrum, 408
U.S. 125 (1972).
130 "The interests controlling a group of controlled taxpayers are assumed to have complete
power to cause each controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and ac-
counting records truly reflect the taxable income from the property and business of each of the
controlled taxpayers." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1A(b)(1) (1993) (applicable to taxable years begin-
ning on or before Apr. 21, 1993). The controlled foreign corporation regulations assert that an
oral agreement to vote shares in one's favor can produce control and the section 482 regulations
deny that legal enforceability is a requirement. See supra note 124.
131 405 U.S. 394 (1972).
132 961 F. 2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1992).
133 The Court's rationale in First Security Bank of Utah, supra note 131, was essentially that
the taxpayer should not be taxed on income that had not yet been received, and that it was
prohibited, by law, from receiving. That is to be contrasted with the tax treatment of the exten-
sion of that situation, the actual receipt of income, the receipt of which is illegal. The Court
acknowledged that it was not dealing with the law addressing the latter situation, which generally
holds that the recipient is taxed on the illegal gains, and the illegality is not a bar to taxation. See
405 U.S. at 405, n.19 and accompanying text. The Procter & Gamble decision, supra note 132,
applied the principles of First Security Bank of Utah in an international context. Very simply, the
Service asserted that Procter & Gamble's Spanish subsidiary had not paid sufficient royalties to a
wholly-owned Swiss subsidiary of Procter & Gamble for certain intangibles which would in turn
produce Subpart F income to the United States parent) and asserted a section 482 adjustment.
However, Spanish law prohibited the payment of royalties in the amounts sought to be allocated
by the Service. The Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that income could
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governing laws of an applicable sovereign, the United States and
Spanish governments, respectively, forbade the payment of the in-
creased amounts represented by the Service's allocation, and the
courts rejected the Service's adjustment. In the hypothetical posed
earlier, however, the controlling persons would be seeking to pay
more than an appropriate price to, or undercharge, related persons, in
violation of their fiduciary duties. The Service would probably seek to
eliminate the overpayment as a deduction or allocate additional in-
come for the amount of the undercharge. The goals of the Service
would be roughly congruent with the fiduciary law requirements. The
Procter & Gamble result does not therefore suggest that fiduciary
legal constraints pre-empt the Service's application of section 482.134
The fiduciary law aspects of improper pricing could be modified
by the express agreement of the parties concerning transfer pricing
procedure. In addition to the arm's length pricing and competitive
pricing clauses mentioned above,135 the agreement may specify that
the joint venture can purchase inputs from the lowest-cost source
available. 136 That, of course, can shift the controversy from price to
suitability and quality, or be of little relevance to the transfer of
unique technology.
Aside from the question of whether the "improper" payments vi-
olate duties owed to the affected entity, the imposition of the section
482 accuracy-related penalty 37 would potentially subject the corpora-
not be imputed top an amount, the payment of which was illegal under Spanish law. For some of
the commentary on this case, see Marc M. Levy & James P. Clancy, LR.S. Seeks to Reverse
Procter & Gamble With Proposed 482 Regulations, 4 J. lr'L TAX'N 137 (1993). See also Exxon
Corporation v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1707 (1993), in which the Tax Court applied
Procter & Gamble in the context of crude oil transfer pricing.
134 This even assumes that the violation of fiduciary duties that give rise to a private action, in
the absence of the violation of a public law like embezzlement, would be considered a governing
law of a stature with the laws of the United States and Spain involved in First Security Bank of
Utah and Procter & Gamble. In that regard, the Service in Procter & Gamble attempted unsuc-
cessfully to distinguish that case from First Security Bank of Utah on the basis that the latter
result extended only to U.S. federal law. See generally 961 F.2d at 1259.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
136 Dymsza, supra note 117, at 413. The United States participant, on the other hand, will
have a strong interest in quality, availability, and price if the joint venture agreement, usually at
the insistence of the host country government, requires host country-supplied inputs. See gener-
ally L. Crawford Brickley, Comment, Equity Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China:
The Promised Land is Not Yet in Sight for Foreign Investors, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 257,281-
86 (1988).
137 The Internal Revenue Code imposes a twenty percent penalty for a "substantial valuation
misstatement," and a forty percent penalty with respect to "gross valuation misstatements" con-
cerning discrepancies in the claimed price for property, the use of property, or services or con-
cerning a "transfer price adjustment" which is tied to the overall effect of multiple
misstatements. See I.R.C. § 6662 (1988 & Supp. 1993-94 (CCH)).
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tion's management to state law derivative actions. There is some pre-
cedent in connection with penalties assessed under the accumulated
earnings tax. 38
c. Specific Control Issues
The materials that follow will focus on several types of control
devices and their effect on the section 482 control issues. It must, of
course, be emphasized that although the principles of analysis are of
general application, the specifics of control arrangements can only be
determined with reference to the type of entity and the prevailing law,
generally Anglo-American or civil, which through obscure details can
produce significant differences. 39 Moreover, if the relationship is a
contractual joint venture, that is not construed as a partnership or
other entity invoking the company laws of the host country or other
pertinent jurisdiction, the control of the venture will be dictated by
the terms of the contract.
40
(1) Day-to-Day Operations - The Joint Venture Manager
Matters can be complicated further by examining some of the in-
ternal workings of international joint ventures. In many cases, a man-
ager of the joint venture will be designated. This individual, or
company, manages the daily affairs of the joint venture on behalf of
the owners. The manager may be chosen by, and be a former em-
ployee of, one of the joint venture partners. 141 Nevertheless, one
138 See, eg., Note, Derivative Actions Arising From Payment of Penalty Taxes Under Section
102, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 394 (1949).
139 For a brief but excellent discussion of the special aspects of civil law forms of business
organization and their effects on control, see GusTra~soN & PuoH, supra note 90, ch. 15. For a
summary of the private and public company laws of European countries, see P. MENHARDT,
COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE (3rd ed. 1981).
140 Reliance strictly on the contract requires attention to detail, because without entity law
there will be no default governance provisions or procedures for termination and'winding up.
See generally Johnson, supra note 21, at 303. For a general discussion of common joint venture
provisions see Michael E. Hooton, Structuring and Negotiating International Joint Ventures, 27
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1013 (1994).
141 The selection of the joint venture management can be confrontational. "Management de-
velopment is a strategic responsibility of top management, so an inclination to demand staffing
authorities on the venture in itself is not a surprise. At one extreme in this dilemma, one finds
the partner who, after having stipulated a majority contribution in financing the venture's equity
and loans, demands to select and appoint the management of the joint venture by itself. The
other partner may then stipulate to put a controller in the venture." Willem T.M. Koot, Underly-
ing Dilemmas in the Management of International Joint Ventures, in CooPERATnv STRATGIES
N INTERNATIONAL Bushess, supra note 8, 347, 360-61. "In 70 percent of the Mexican joint
ventures, the joint venture's policies and procedures were a replication of one parent's. Since in
each of those cases, the [joint venture general manager] had been appointed by the parent who
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study found that the joint venture managers "tend to see their alle-
giance to the joint venture first and to the parents second." '142
Influence over the joint venture management team alone would
not necessarily tip the scales in favor of a finding of control. In Ca-
yuga Service, Inc. v. Commissioner143 two parties each owned fifty
percent of the stock of the corporation. The same parties held equal
interests in other related enterprises to a degree that might have sug-
gested a common design to shift income or expenses, but that was not
the basis of the Tax Court's holding. 14 The Tax Court found that con-
trol existed because one fifty percent shareholder's "people" con-
trolled the board of directors and held all the corporate offices but
one. However, the other fifty percent shareholder was the president
and handled the day-to-day management of the company. As far as
the board meetings, each director had one vote and there was no
agreement requiring unanimity, nor any agreement among the share-
holders as to how to vote. Although the Tax Court did not discuss this
issue, it would seem that the ultimate result can be justified only if, in
view of the deadlock situation, the original slate of directors, which
favored the one shareholder by a margin of two to one, became fixed
as a practical matter.
The control wielded through the office of the manager can be
made even more direct under the provisions of foreign law. In a
French limited liability company, for example, it has been suggested
that the organizational documents could designate a sole manager
chosen by one of the parties, who could not be dismissed except for
cause. Removal for cause in turn could be made more difficult by
requiring a super majority vote that would provide the sponsoring
party with a veto.145 In that regard, in Garlock, Inc. v. Commis-
had established the policies and procedures, the [joint venture general manager] had a clear
understanding of the joint venture's operating rules." Jean-Louis Schaan & Paul W. Beamish,
Joint Venture General Managers in LDCs, in COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS, supra note 8, 279, 289-90.
142 Schaan & Beamish, supra note 141, at 290.
143 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 18 (1975).
144 The Service allocated imputed interest income to the taxpayer for interest-free advances
made to affiliated companies. The Tax Court followed the Second Circuit's opinion in Forman v.
Commissioner, supra note 100, concerning the validity of imputing income, where none previ-
ously existed, to reflect the true taxable income of the taxpayers. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 26. How-
ever, the control issue was not decided on a Forman, in concert, basis. See generally 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 25, n.3.
145 See GUSTAFSON & PUGH, supra note 90, at 779. The Treasury regulations assert that relin-
quishing control over the selection of the manager, while retaining all other powers of a majority
position, would not avoid controlled foreign corporation status. See supra note 126.
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sioner,a46 dealing with controlled foreign corporation status, the arti-
cles of incorporation were amended to provide for director terms of
one to five years. The United States shareholder's representatives
held three of the five shareholder spots, which permitted them to con-
trol the board of directors for five years unless removed by majority
vote of the shareholders. However, the voting structure was fifty-
fifty deadlock, so barring the death of a director, 47 the United States
shareholder could control for at least five years. The Tax Court found
that the United States shareholder clearly held practical control of the
corporation. "Barring arbitration, there was no means whereby the
preferred shareholders could, if they had wished to do so, challenge
that control." '148
As demonstrated by Garlock, Inc., the controlled foreign corpo-
ration cases typically make a very close examination of the actual
shareholder behavior, apart from stock ownership percentages. In
Kraus v. Commissioner,'49 for example, the appellate court found it
significant that the other shareholders "were carefully selected ... so
that no rocking of the corporate boat could be anticipated."'5 0 The
shareholders were either relatives, close personal friends, or business
associates. At only one meeting of the shareholders did any of the
shareholders outside of the Kraus family appear in person. The com-
pliant initial board of directors would continue in office until their
successors were elected, but again, due to the deadlock voting position
of the common and preferred shareholders, they could not be ousted
without the acquiescence of the common shareholders. 1 Although
the preferred shareholders were represented at all meetings, they
were very agreeable, leading the court to observe that "[t]he record is
barren of any indication of dissent or disapproval of any preferred
stockholder in person or by proxy at any meeting.'
15 2
It was again a significant fact in Koehring Co. v. United States'53
that none of the outside shareholder directors participated in six out
of ten board meetings. In addition, none of the outside directors, rep-
resenting fifty-five percent of the voting stock, had signature authority
146 58 T.C. 423 (1972), aff'd, 489 F. 2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 911 (1974).
147 Panamanian law permitted a majority of the remaining members of the board to elect a
successor. 58 T.C. at 431. That would give Garlock, Inc. only two out of four voting directors.
148 58 T.C. at 437. The shareholders' agreement expressly permitted arbitration. See infra
text accompanying notes 180-82.
149 59 T.C. 681 (1973), aff'd, 490 F. 2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974).
150 490 F. 2d 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1974).
151 See generally 59 T.C. at 693.
152 490 F. 2d at 903.
153 583 F. 2d 313 (7th Cir. 1978).
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over checking accounts. On the other hand, in CCA, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,154 in which the taxpayer prevailed, the Swiss corporate law per-
mitted only individuals with "signature power" to act on behalf of the
corporation. The members of the board of directors representing the
outside shareholders were not excluded from this group and any two
could act jointly on behalf of the corporation. 55
(2) Majority Equity Ownership
One would generally assume that a fifty-one to forty-nine percent
ownership structure of a two-participant venture gives the majority
participant working control of the entity, and control for purposes of
section 482 would most likely be found under these circumstances. 56
This would seem to be the case although extraordinary decisions, like
a sale of the business assets, require unanimous or a supermajority
approval, unless the transaction in question was one of those ex-
traordinary events.' 57 This assumes the absence of aspects of local law
or features in the organizational documents that empower the minor-
ity position, such as multiple classes of voting stock, cumulative vot-
ing, voting trusts, or shareholder agreements.' 58
154 64 T.C. 137 (1975).
155 See generally 64 T.C. at 145-46.
156 The controlled foreign corporation regulations interpreting I.R.C. § 957, which requires
"more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to
vote," state that this requirement is met in a situation where each share of stock has one vote for
all purposes and the United States person in question owns 51 percent of the voting stock. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(c), Example 1 (1988). In the redemption context, the Service has ruled that
a decrease in interest from fifty-seven percent to fifty percent should be treated as a sale or
exchange because of the loss of voting control, provided that only one other shareholder owns
the remaining interest in the corporation. See Rev. Rul. 75-502, 1975-2 C.B. 111. Of course, if
the other shares are widely dispersed, even a less than 50 percent stake could control the
enterprise.
157 In South Texas Rice Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, the court rejected the argument that
the otherwise controlling shareholders did not control the transaction in question because it
required a supermajority approval. See infra text accompanying notes 227-30. In the redemp-
tion context, however, some courts have found that the loss of control over even extraordinary
transactions can provide sale or exchange treatment for a redemption. See BIrr'ER & EusTicE,
supra note 44 9.05[3][d]. See also infra note 168.
158 "Cumulative voting and voting trusts are normally not recognized in civil law countries
and a shareholders' agreement limiting the shareholders' freedom to vote may be void or unen-
forceable." GusrAFso N & PuGmi, supra note 90, at 776. For example, "[v]oting agreements are
legally unenforceable" in the French public limited company, the socidtd anonyme, or S.A. MEIN-
HARDT, supra note 139, at F-9(ii). "Non-voting and multiple-voting shares are not permitted" in
a French private limited company, the socidti J responsabilitd lirnitde, or S.A.R.L. Id. at F-24(iii).
On the other hand, in a Netherlands public limited company, Naamloze Vennootschap, or N.V.,
"[a]greements on voting between shareholders are permissible, unless they are contrary to good
faith." Id. at NL-12(ii). See generally PH. John Kozyris, Equal Joint-Venture Corporations in
France: Problems of Control and Resolution of Deadlocks, 17 AM. J. COMp. L. 503 (1969).
Control in Section 482
15:1 (1994)
In the absence of special voting requirements, the holders of a
majority of ownership interests are generally considered to be in con-
trol. In Cannon v. Commissioner,159 the taxpayer was a limited part-
ner holding a forty-five percent 160 interest in the partnership and a
majority interest in a related corporation. Although the taxpayer was
only a limited partner, the court found that she exerted "financial con-
trol" over each organization that supported a section 482 allocation.
The other partners in the partnership held thirty percent, nine per-
cent, eight percent, and eight percent interests. The court did not
raise the issue of whether the other partners could combine forces to
oppose the interests of the forty-five percent party. The court also did
not note that the second largest interest, the thirty percent, was held
by the general partner who would be a likely candidate for legal con-
trol of a limited partnership.'
6'
In the context of Japanese investments, it has been observed that
the fifty-one to forty-nine arrangement yields illusory benefits.
[U]Itimate control is normally not possible in the case of many important
corporate decisions. Merger, liquidation, and other major decisions re-
quire a two-thirds vote of the shareholders.... [F]ifty-one percent con-
trol is often more nominal than real. Typically, a Japanese joint venture
will be staffed by personnel provided by the Japanese partner, which
means in essence that the Japanese partner will control day-to-day man-
agement decisions. A controlling United States partner often finds it
difficult or impossible to reverse events put into motion through the in-
cremental daily decisions of local management.' 62
The ownership and control structures in application are under-
standably subject to almost infinite variation. One writer has com-
pared the control aspects of three United States company joint
ventures with foreign parties. In the NII-NKK joint venture a United
States steel company sold fifty percent of National Steel to Nipon
159 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 164 (1990).
160 One description of the interest by the court notes a "54%" interest. A later percentage in
profits and proceeds of the partnership is "45%," and taken together with the other partners'
interests that totals one hundred percent.
161 It is interesting that this argument is not made by taxpayers in light of the presumption of
in concert action by otherwise minority shareholders followed by the Service in its rulings in the
redemption area. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-106, 1985-2 C.B. 116 ( minority shareholder had not
parted with control because it could participate in a "control group" by acting in concert with
two other shareholders).
162 Rosser H. Brockman, Foreign (Local) Law Issues, 38 Bus. LAv. 1064, 1068 (1983). One
observer has written that the United States desire for control can be damaging to the business.
"When Americans and Europeans come to Japan, they all want 51 percent.... But good part-
nerships, like good marriages, don't work on the basis of ownership or control. It takes effort
and commitment and enthusiasm from both sides if either is to realize the hoped-for benefits."
KENiCHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD 119 (1991).
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Kokon. The partners have equal representation on the board of direc-
tors, but United States managers direct day-to-day operations.' 63
AT&T Phillips Telecommunications, V.V. was also started as a fifty-
fifty joint venture. AT&T has three votes, while Phillips has only two,
on the board of directors, but managers are drawn from both compa-
nies.'6" The third venture, Beijing Jeep Corporation, Ltd., was created
by American Motors Corporation and a company of the Chinese gov-
ernment. The United States company owned only thirty-one percent
of the venture and its control, from a legal standpoint, is weak.165
(3) Veto Provisions
Positions on the board of directors that are disproportionate in
number to equity ownership, or the requirement of super majority ap-
proval of selected transactions, for example, can permit a less than
equal owner to maintain at least deadlock with the other venturers. 66
Certainly, the United States company should seek at least a veto. This
does not, however, mean that the share division must be fifty-fifty, be-
cause it is usually possible to manipulate voting requirements in the
board and shareholder meetings to produce mutual vetoes, even though
one of the partners may hold less than fifty percent of the voting
shares.'
67
If the veto is only for selected matters, the resulting power should
exist only with respect to the transaction in question. That approach
was, however, rejected in a noted family control situation. 68 If the
163 Root, supra note 19, at 78.
164 Root, supra note 19, at 78. Assuming that a majority vote of the directors is the rule,
AT&T would probably be considered a controlling party.
165 Root, supra note 19, at 78. One can find a number of additional anecdotes about joint
venture arrangements, particularly with Japanese companies. For example, Hewlett-Packard's
first joint venture in Japan began in 1963, with the United States company holding fifty-one
percent of the joint venture with Yokogawa Electric. In 1983, "Yokogawa Electric gave Hewlett-
Packard another 24 percent." OHMAE, supra note 162, at 119.
166 Again the unique aspects of the host country law must be considered. With respect to an
Italian public limited company, the soceitd per azioni, or S.P.A., "[n]on-voting and multiple-
voting shares are not permitted. However, the articles may provide that preference shareholders
are entitled to vote at extraordinary and not at ordinary general meetings. Shares carrying re-
stricted rights may not exceed 50 percent of the capital." MEINHARDT, supra note 139, at 1-9(i).
167 Brockman, supra note 162, at 1067-68. "As a minimum, the veto right should cover such
matters as amendment of the corporation's [organizational documents], new investments, con-
tracts with affiliated companies or shareholders, sale of a substantial portion of the joint venture
company's assets, acquisitions or mergers, issuance of additional capital stock and borrowing by
the corporation other than in the ordinary course of business." GuSTAFSON & PuGH, supra note
90, at 777.
168 See infra text accompanying notes 227-30 discussing South Texas Warehouse Co. v. Com-
missioner. See also supra note 126 dealing with a requirement of unanimous voting for a sole
manager of a foreign corporation. Nevertheless, by analogy to the law construing "voting
Control in Section 482
15:1 (1994)
veto provisions create the effect of a fifty-fifty joint venture, then
those control issues discussed above are raised. On the other hand,
trying to address the deadlock situation raises the control questions
discussed next.
(4) Deadlock and Purchase Provisions
The joint venture agreement may contain provisions that grant
each venturer a right of first refusal, if another venturer seeks to trans-
fer its interest in the enterprise.169 in some situations, the agreement
will contain a buy-sell arrangement that can be initiated in deadlock
situations.170 If the host country imposes investment restrictions on
the venture's ownership, either provision can have less practical bene-
fit to the United States participant.
17
In the context of section 957, the absence of a deadlock breaking
provision is apparently preferable if the deadlock breaking mecha-
nism would favor one of the shareholders over the other.
United States shareholders ... will be deemed to own the requisite...
voting power... [i]f any person or persons elected or designated by such
shareholders have the power to elect exactly one-half of the members of
such governing body of such foreign corporation, either to cast a vote
deciding an evenly divided vote of such body or, for the duration of any
deadlock which may arise, to exercise the powers ordinarily exercised by
such governing body.172
power" for consolidated income tax return affiliation requirements, it should matter whether the
transaction in question was one over which the party held veto or other power. In speaking to
the consolidated return situation, Professors Bittker and Eustice wrote that "[t]he term 'voting
power' has come to mean the power to elect the directors and to exclude the power to vote on
such extraordinary events as mergers, sale of assets, and so forth." BrrrKEs & Eus-nca, supra
note 44, 13.41[2][b].
169 The articles of organization of a Netherlands private limited company, Besloten Venoot-
schap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid, or B.V., for example, must generally contain a "blocking
clause" which places restrictions on the transfers of shares, often subjecting the shares to the
required consent of the company or purchase by existing shareholders. MEINHARDT, supra note
139, at NL-24(ii).
170 "Not uncommonly encountered in joint venture agreements are breakup provisions which
are of infinite variety.... The buyout may be according to a pre-established formula, by ap-
praisal, by 'good faith negotiation,' or rarely a put/call option." Mark H. Berens, Foreign Ven-
tures - A Legal Anatomy, 26 Bus. LAw. 1527, 1541 (1971). The extreme forms of these
agreements, the put/call option, have been given various titles, including "Shotgun Buy-Sell,"
"Texas Buy-Sell," "Shootout" or "Russian Roulette." There are many variations on this theme,
but generally one party initiates the process by offering to purchase the other party's interest at
an offered price. The other party then has the option to sell at the offered price or to purchase
the other party's interest at the same price. Even with extended notice and option periods, and
perhaps extended payment terms, this type of arrangement can operate in favor of the wealthier
party.
171 See generally Cherin & Combs, supra note 90, at 1038-39.
172 Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(1)(ii) (1988).
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Differences in management can be resolved through a purchase
of one party's interest. A very one-sided purchase arrangement could
in substance resemble a "call" on the stock of the other shareholder,
and call options were an important factor in Kraus v. Commis-
sioner.173 In Kraus, the United States persons held common stock
that nominally represented fifty percent of the voting power in the
corporation, and foreign persons held preferred stock that enjoyed
fifty percent of the voting power. The preferred shares were subject
to call by the corporation after not less than three months' notice and
could be redeemed at par value plus unpaid dividends. The court
noted that "[t]here was no arrangement for the breaking of a deadlock
in voting, and in view of the call provisions, the redemption of any
dissident stockholder's shares at par value provided an obvious solu-
tion to any problem." 74 The purchase option was not the only blem-
ish. The preferred shareholders were relatives, close personal friends
or business associates of the United States persons and were not ac-
tive in shareholder affairs.175 The preferred stock could be transferred
only with the approval of the board of directors, and consent could be
withheld for "important reasons,"' 76 which helped insure that the cast
of obedient shareholders would be maintained. The sale of the
outside persons' shares was also neatly orchestrated by the United
States persons when it was expedient. Based on this record, the court
found that "real" voting power still rested with the United States
persons.
In Koehring Co. v. United States177 the taxpayer had structured
the transaction in a manner that was probably assumed to be palatable
fare for a reviewing court. The outside preferred shareholder held
fifty-five percent voting power, rather than just deadlock power, and
there were no "formal restrictions on transfer, call features, or charter
provisions permitting [the preferred shareholder] to force redemption
of its shares."'178 However, the appellate court did not disturb the
lower court's conclusion on the evidence that the preferred share-
holder had an "understanding" that it had the right to compel the re-
173 59 T.C. 681 (1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1974). Compare General Corp. Law of
Delaware § 273, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 273 (1974) (procedure for judicial dissolution of joint
venture corporations having only two fifty percent stockholders).
174 490 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir. 1974).
175 See supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
176 490 F. 2d at 900.
177 583 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1978).
178 583 F. 2d at 318.
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demption of its stock.179 In Kraus, the presence of a call was fatal
because it permitted the elimination of troublemakers. In Koehring,
the presence of a put was equally fatal because it made it possible for
the preferred shareholder to exit at will, and that, coupled with the
lack of upside financial potential of traditional preferred stock, helped
support the court's view of a shareholder with little interest in vigor-
ous management of the company.
In Garlock Inc. v. Commissioner80 the stock was transferable
only with the prior written consent of the board of directors, and such
consent could not be unreasonably withheld. The preferred share-
holders had little long-term commitment to the corporation, because
after one year they had the right to put the stock to the corporation on
120 days' prior notice. The voting rights were in a fifty-fifty dead-
lock configuration, but the agreements provided for the arbitration of
shareholder disputes. 181 The arbitration provision, which on its face
would make control appear even-handed, was dismissed by the court.
[T]he picture of corporate sales, management and other decisions in the
fast-moving international trade world of the mid-1960's being made
through the process of arbitration under the rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce is very nearly risible - the product, perhaps, of
an imaginative tax lawyer's drafting contemplations, surely not a work-
ing solution to real business needs.82
In CCA, Inc. v. Commissioner,183 the taxpayer had declined to
include the common Swiss corporate law provision that the chairman
of the Board of Administrators had the authority to break tie votes of
the administrators. a84 The taxpayer had scrupulously avoided the in-
clusion of any redemption power by the corporation or put rights on
behalf of the shareholders, and there was no provision for resolving
179 Id. at 318 n.7.
180 See supra note 146.
181 See generally 489 F.2d at 199.
182 489 F.2d at 202. The cumulative weight of the other factors probably moved the court to
dismiss arbitration so summarily. Arbitration is a common remedy in international business
agreements and is reportedly used frequently in joint venture agreements. "Arbitration clauses
are the most commonly used contractual tools for providing alternative dispute resolution in
joint ventures." Steven R. Salbu, Parental Coordination and Conflict in International Joint Ven-
tures: The Use of Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and Cultural Concerns, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 1221, 1228 (1993). But see Kozyris, supra note 158, at 523-24 ("It is not surprising...
that the use of arbitration to resolve business disputes in France has been rather rare ....
[A]rbitration is better suited to rendering quasi-judicial decisions, rather than managerial
ones.... [A]rbitration is cumbersome.").
183 64 T.C. 137 (1975).
184 See generally id. at 144. This is reportedly typical and not limited to Swiss law. "One
common solution is to give the chairman... the right to a so-called casting or extra vote in the
case of tie." See Berens, supra note 170, at 1541.
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deadlocks among shareholders. The transfer of stock by any share-
holder did require the approval of the board of administrators, the
membership of which was deadlocked at five members appointed by
the common shareholders and five members appointed by the pre-
ferred shareholders. The court did not consider the transfer restric-
tions unreasonable. First, they applied to all shareholders, common
and preferred, and did not single out the preferred stock held by the
outside shareholders. Second, the provision was a carryover from the
old articles of organization that had applied to the corporation when it
had only common stock outstanding, and was not apparently added to
deal with the new preferred shareholders. Third, it was reasonable to
restrict transfers of stock in such a corporation, even if it helped to
assure that at least fifty percent of the stock would remain in the
hands of non-United States persons, so that controlled foreign corpo-
ration status would continue to be avoided.
D. Control Outside the Closely-Held Context
1. Control Through Business Relationships
The types of control-generating interests discussed above typi-
cally involve some type of equity involvement, or an interest, like an
option, that could ripen into such a position. An emerging issue is
whether control through economic power, without an ownership inter-
est, can give rise to relatedness that would properly invoke application
of section 482. One could offer a number of examples. Consider the
position of an enterprise that does not itself have any unique qualities
or expertise but that is the sole distributor of a unique good. Does the
producer of the good "control" the distributor? Similarly, consider an
enterprise that relies on unique licensed technology or a supply of a
scarce commodity. Again, consider an enterprise that is a borrower
from, or the beneficiary of guarantees given by, one principal lender.
There is little guidance in this area, but this topic is discussed in the
last part of this paper.'" 5
2. Control of the Publicly Held Corporation
In following the well-traveled path blazed by Berle and Means,' 86
it is not surprising that publicly held corporations can be controlled by
a less than majority shareholder (or shareholder group) or, on the
other hand, by management. In the first general case, a less than ma-
185 See infra text accompanying notes 236-89.
186 See Berle & Means, supra note 55.
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jority shareholder could control because the other shares are so dis-
persed that no other party can mount a challenge, except in very
extraordinary circumstances."8 An otherwise minority shareholding
group could also control through "legal devices" such as pyramid
ownership structures, non-voting stock or stock with superior voting
power, or a voting trust.'88 The Berle and Means treatise is probably
most famous for the second case, that it is a predictable result of the
rise of the publicly held corporation that control of the entity will be
separated from the owners (the shareholders) and wielded by the
managers. So-called "management control" exists where no owner-
ship bloc is large enough to constitute owner control of the entity,
such that management remains imbedded and in control until a crisis
occurs that moves the shareholders to action.18 9
Although there is little case law applying section 482 to publicly
held corporations beyond dealings with their subsidiaries, it would
seem that control would be found in the presence of legal devices.
The same result should follow from minority control. In an interna-
tional context, Disney's ownership of EuroDisney raises this issue.
While Disney owns only a forty-nine percent share in the French com-
pany, the remaining fifty-one percent is publicly held, such that Dis-
ney surely controls the subsidiary for section 482 purposes.' 90
Management control is more provocative because it would sug-
gest that interlocking control by professional managers, without signif-
icant ownership stakes, could subject the controlled entities to section
482. Because of the state law fiduciary duty conflicts, it is difficult to
envision such overlapping management without ownership that over-
laps to a corresponding degree.191 However, such structures could
arise, particularly in dealing with ownership structures that do not
necessarily follow the traditional themes of those encountered in the
United States.
187 Berle and Means describe this phenomenon as "working control." Bearle & Means, supra
note 55, at 80.
188 Bearle & Means, supra note 55, at 72-80.
189 Bearle & Means, supra note 55, at 84-90. The work of Berle and Means has been criti-
cized, in part, because it does not acknowledge the power of takeovers and unfriendly acquisi-
tions in which control ultimately rests with the shareholders. See, e.g., George J. Stigler & Claire
Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 237,247-
48 (1983). It has also been argued that the degree of ownership by the directors and manage-
ment is larger than that suggested by Berle and Means. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Structure
of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 387-90 (1983).
190 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
191 Of course, one could find such situations if one searches. In Southern College of Optome-
try, supra note 60, there existed overlapping management without overlapping ownership.
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3. The Keiretsu Structure
The "keiretsu" is an informal Japanese business structure that has
attracted recent attention, particularly in the context of trade and anti-
trust enforcement. 192 The keiretsu groups are generally divided into
horizontal keiretsu and vertical keiretsu.193
a. Horizontal Keiretsu
Essentially, the horizontal keiretsu involves an interlocking group
of companies, often with a bank at the center. "Only the six largest
city banks ... and the leading long-term credit bank.., are commonly
referred to as the centers of their own industrial groups. In English,
they are simply the Big Six .... The Big Six are the strongest and
most representative horizontal keiretsu."'194 Each member of the
group has some practical business relationship with the others, for ex-
ample, as a lender, supplier, or customer. The relationship provided
by regular business dealings can be strengthened by reciprocal stock
ownership, but in many cases the ownership stake of one company in
another will be less than five percent. Representatives at different
levels of the group may meet very informally, over lunch in many
cases, but the consensus is said to be as binding as that provided by
formal written resolution. Additional "glue" for the arrangement is
provided by the collectivist nature of Japanese culture and transcends
legal documentation. One early account described the relationship of
the then forty-three member Mitsubishi group:
There is no parent corporation. In addition to national pride and a com-
mon cultural heritage for group cooperation, what links the companies
together is an array of cross-shareholdings and intercorporate trading.
Since the profits of one are partly linked to the profits of another, there
is an inducement to give business to one another and to participate in
continuing contractor/sub contractor, and other cooperative projects.
These activities are coordinated by the Kinyo-kai or Friday
Conference.
195
If the keiretsu acts as such a disciplined unit, the implications for
transfer pricing abuse are obvious. The foreign members of the
keiretsu could overcharge the United States affiliates of keiretsu
192 See, e.g., Julie A. Shepard, Using United States Antitrust Laws Against the Keiretsu as a
Wedge into the Japanese Market, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 345 (1993); Jonathan E. Johnson III,
Keiretsu Their Effect on Business and How American Government and Business Can Confront
Them, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1155 (1992); KENIcHI MIYASHiTA & DAVID W. RUSSELL, KEIRETSU
- INSIDE THE HIDDEN JAPANESE CONGLOMERATES (1994).
193 See generally MnASmTA & RUSSELL, supra note 192, at 8-12.
194 MIYASHrTA & RUSSELL, supra note 192, at 9.
195 ROBERT EMMErr TINDALL, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 79 (1975).
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members, thereby reducing income subject to United States taxation.
The overcharge could be adjusted in the myriad of transactions be-
tween the members of the keiretsu outside the taxing jurisdiction of
the United States. Lest all purchases from foreign companies be scru-
tinized, one could envision, in more advanced stages of United States
based production, similar pricing abuses among the United States af-
filiates of the keiretsu members. 96
The Service has reported that with respect to a keiretsu, "a court
would uphold a broad interpretation of Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1, and that
in an appropriate case the IRS may assert that a minority shareholder
is in control."' 97 If the Service wished to aggregate the minority inter-
ests of the keiretsu members, the common objective required by For-
man 98 would be more difficult to establish under the subtle facts of
the keiretsu, which are based on the expectation of mutual benefit
that cannot be reduced to a legally binding expectancy. If the com-
mon objective requirement is instead a test for establishing why other-
wise independent companies would act in concert, then the inquiry
might be refocused to why such companies would act together. The
standard must be more than simply acting together for one another's
mutual benefit. Presumably that would apply to most joint venturers
who have joined together for a project with the expectation of profit,
and Forman arguably isn't that broad. On the other hand, the
keiretsu seems to create a tighter relationship than simply goodwill, or
the expectation of reciprocal favors, created through continuous deal-
ings or repeated patronage. There are very modest interlocking own-
ership interests, but taken alone they are not sufficient to create the
power usually identified with control.
The complex mixture of factors legal, practical, historical, and
cultural that create the keiretsu are not contemplated by the largely
legalistic views of control. As discussed in the material that follows,
the courts, in applying section 482 to family groups, have tended to
assume, in more recent cases, that members of a family act in concert,
beyond legal ties. In that regard, members of the family may be pre-
sumed to generally act in one another's best interests, not at arm's
length, for reasons that they are "family."' 199 There may be a general
expectation of family support, that favors will be returned at some
196 For example, one affiliate might otherwise have unutilized United States operating losses,
while another is very profitable.
197 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
SECTION 482, 19 (1992) [hereinafter "IRS 482 REPORT"].
198 See supra text accompanying notes 101-09.
199 I will resist the obvious analogy that could be made to organized crime "families."
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time, and in some form, but neither the immediacy nor the legal en-
forceability2 °° is crucial. Those ties could be weakened if certain
"family" members perceive that, overall, they receive less from the
relationship than they give. In commenting on the keiretsu relation-
ship, one writer observed:
The officers of these firms do, in fact, place the interest of their own
company over that of the Group. They are willing to cooperate only
insofar as such collaboration will be beneficial to their own firm. But it
usually is .... 2
01
In that regard, it has been observed that the major benefit of horizon-
tal keiretsu is not monopolistic profit sharing, but rather stable profit-
ability and security. Much of the stability stems from the reciprocal
aid provided by the keiretsu described as an "implicit mutual insur-
ance scheme.1
20 2
It is uncomfortable to speak in terms of "family" in connection
with large corporations or other business entities. The family tie tran-
scends the dealings of the marketplace, and involves a great deal of
altruistic behavior that is probably lacking in the keiretsu.20 3
Although an analogy to family is probably overstated, some compari-
sons might be made. The portion of the Service's report on section
482 dealing with the keiretsu opened with language suggesting some
similarities in the international audit difficulties encountered in family
control and keiretsu control situations.
200 In the controlled foreign corporation regulations, legal enforceability of voting agree-
ments is not a requirement. See supra note 124. The controlled foreign corporation case law
also focuses on the practical setting of the parties, e.g., as family members, friends, or business
associates. See supra text accompanying notes 146-54 & 172-84.
201 TINDALL, supra note 195, at 46.
202 MIYASHIrA & RussELL, supra note 192, at 197.
203 The role of altruism in the family has been the source of significant scholarly inquiry. See
generally GARY S. BECKER, A TrtAnsaE ON THE FAMiLY (1991). Some of the family dynamics
turn upon a hierarchical structure, in which the altruist, typically a parent, makes gifts to other
family members, and the expectation of those gifts helps keep members "in line."
The Rotten Kid Theorem can explain why a parent delays some contributions until later
stages of his lifetime; he wants to provide his children with a long-run incentive to consider
the interests of the whole family. Indeed, he might retain some contributions until after he
dies so that he can have the last word. He would not usually delay all contributions to the
end, partly because he must establish good faith with his children.
Id. at 293. It seems that the horizontal keiretsu is not an easy analogy. First, unlike humans,
business corporations have perpetual existence, and there is no compelling incentive to dis-
tribute largesse to others altruistically. Second, Professor Becker's theory would seem to rest on
the presence of a hierarchical altruist, sprinkling wealth to lower levels. The keiretsu does not
generally have a parent company structure, and all of the members are more akin to sibling
companies, which would seem to suggest a looser, more autonomous relationship among the
members of the group.
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International examination personnel are confronting a number of situa-
tions in which a family group or consortium of corporate taxpayers con-
ducts an integrated economic enterprise coordinated through minority
stock ownership. The issue these operations present is whether a share-
holder can control a corporation for purposes of section 482 despite the
absence of majority ownership. One example is the Japanese concept
known as keiretsu... 2 4
b. Vertical Keiretsu
As the terminology suggests, a vertical keiretsu is an arrangement
resembling parent-subsidiary chains, or pyramids, of entities as op-
posed to brother-sister relationships. The vertical keiretsu is report-
edly more common in manufacturing industries where numerous
suppliers are required. °5 While the first several tiers of subsidiaries
may be owned in whole or in part by the parent company, and may
bear the parent's name, there are no ownership ties to the lower level
members. The bond of the lower level members to the upper tiers is
through an exclusive production relationship with those layers above
them. "The Japanese tradition of loyalty within a hierarchy has made
it very difficult, until quite recently, for subcontractors or free-lance
operators to work for more than one organization. '206 It has been
estimated, for example, that when all the small "mom-and-pop" firms
are included, there are around six thousand companies in the NEC
keiretsu.2 °7
The first layers of the vertical keiretsu that are affiliated with the
parent company through ownership are amenable to traditional analy-
sis. However, the lower tiers, whose only link is a course of exclusive
dealings, present more difficult issues. It is reported that the ex-
penses, production methods and investment policies, and overall prof-
itability of the lower tier subcontractors are monitored by the keiretsu
with excruciating detail. The subcontractors are periodically required
to slash their prices and must deliver products on tight "just-in-time"
schedules. Options were limited in the past because if a supplier
wished to "defect" from the keiretsu, competing keiretsu would not
deal with the defector.20 However, due to economic pressures that
ruined many subcontractors, the vertical keiretsu, particularly in man-
204 IRS 482 REPORT, supra note 197, at 19.
205 MIYASHITA & RUSSELL, supra note 192, at 12.
206 MIYASHITA & RUSSELL, supra note 192, at 12.
207 MIYASHrA & RUSSELL, supra note 192, at 12-13.
208 MIYASFITA & RUSSELL, supra note 192, at 159 (restrictions on outside work); 166-68; 174-
75 (parent review of supplier operations).
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ufacturing, is reportedly in decline, and subcontractors are more likely
to do business with several parties.0 9
The Japanese vertical keiretsu subcontractor relationship is not
without its United States counterparts. Some domestic manufacturers
maintain long-term contractual relationships with suppliers. The issue
of whether such economic control over a person is within the realm of
section 482 "control" is addressed in the last part of this article.
E. "Control" in Family Arrangements
In several contexts, the Internal Revenue Code inflexibly aggre-
gates interests owned by "family" members, irrespective of the coop-
erativeness of given individuals.210 Such attribution rules are not
incorporated in section 482. In reading the cases in this area one must
distinguish situations in which individuals act in concert for their own
self-interests, and happen to also be related to one another, from
those in which it is presumed that individuals acquiesce in the deci-
sions of others, due to family dynamics.
1. Spouses and Children
The courts do not generally admit that immediate family mem-
bers, particularly spouses, will be presumed to act in concert due
solely to the family relationship. However, one commentator has of-
fered that "[a]s a starting point, in the absence of strong facts to the
contrary, whenever the attribution rules of section 318 would impute
control, there will be control for section 482 purposes. 21 '
a. Some Exceptions
Some taxpayers, particularly in older cases, avoided summary ap-
plication of section 482 to family-owned enterprises. In Rolland Mo-
tor Co., Inc. v. Commissioner,212 the Tax Court addressed the
relationship between the owners of a corporation and a sole proprie-
torship. Mr. Rolland owned 32.24 percent of the stock of the corpora-
tion, and his wife owned the remainder. He was also the president
209 MiYASHrrA & RUSSELL, supra note 192, at 201-02.
210 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 318(a), 267(c)(4), 7872(0(7).
211 Nauheim, supra note 106, at 109. On the other hand, since section 482 turns on the "real-
ity" of control, control might be defeated by established family hostility, which otherwise would
have little effect on section 318 attribution. For the case law dealing with "bad blood" and
section 318, see BrIrER & EusTxcE, supra note 44, 1 9.02 [2], n.48. In referring to many of the
same authorities cited by Professors Bittker and Eustice, one commentator concluded that fam-
ily hostility should deflect a finding of section 482 control. See Fuller, supra note 75, at 483 n.44.
212 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 143 (1953).
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and treasurer of the corporation. The Tax Court refused to allocate to
the corporation all of the net income earned by the sole proprietor-
ship that was owned one hundred percent by Mr. Rolland. The result,
however, apparently did not turn on the absence of control, and in-
stead was the Tax Court's rejection of the Service's complete alloca-
tion of the taxable income of the sole proprietorship. The court
believed that the statute permitted only a more considered allocation
of items of gross income and deductions, and the wholesale allocation
of all net income, without further analysis, was an abuse of discretion.
In John L. Denning & Company, Inc. v. Commissioner,13 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized that spouses and
children can operate businesses outside of the control of the other
spouse. The husband owned the majority of shares of the taxpayer
corporation, and his wife, son, daughter and twenty other individuals
owned minority interests. The wife, son, and daughter formed a part-
nership that engaged in a similar and very successful business. The
court refused to treat the family as a unitary control group by linking
the corporation and partnership together. The taxpayer enjoyed very
good facts. Mrs. Denning was thoroughly experienced in the business
and entered the new venture against her husband's advice. Mr. Den-
ning contributed no funds to the partnership, and it established its
own credit with independent banks. The partnership ultimately
purchased its own warehouse, but in sharing office space and some
employees in common with the taxpayer, the parties circumspectly al-
located among themselves the overhead expenses, rent, and wages.
The decision first addressed the question of whether the separate
business was a sham arrangement, and then the alternative argument
that section 45, the statutory antecedent of section 482, applied. In
the section 45 discussion the court observed that "[t]he holder of the
majority of the stock in the corporation owned no interest in the part-
nership. The partners owned only a minority interest in the corpora-
tion. The earnings of the two entities were entirely separate and
distinct." '214 However, in the discussion of the sham argument, on
which the taxpayer prevailed, the court observed, apparently reflect-
ing their view of family relationships, that Mr. Denning did control
both entities. "No doubt, John L. Denning exercised a domination
over both the corporation and the partnership, but his domination of
the partnership was because of the family relation and not because of
213 180 F. 2d 288 (10th Cir. 1950).
214 Id. at 291.
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the ownership of any interest therein. '2 15 This observation did not
bode well for the future vitality of the court's decision, which was fix-
ated on the legal ownership percentages rather than on the practical
realities of control.
Again in A.G. Nelson Paper Company, Inc. v. Commissioner,16
the Tax Court found that there was no common ownership or control
between one corporation, owned 50 percent by the husband, 16 2/3
percent by his wife, and 33 1/3 percent by Mr. Leland Marshall, and
another corporation owned 2/3 by the wife and 1/3 by Mr. Marshall's
wife. The corporation owned by the wives was therefore held exactly
in the same proportions as the two households' ownership of stock in
the taxpayer. The decision is even more extreme because in Rolland
Motor Co. and John L. Denning & Co., the principal inquiry was
whether the related entities were to be respected as separate taxpay-
ers, and except for some shared expenses, there were few dealings
among the entities. In A.G. Nelson Paper Company, Inc., however,
the second corporation was formed by the wives to own a building
that was leased to the taxpayer, directly raising arm's length rental
concerns. The new corporation, Plainridge Corporation, leased the
building from its owner, so capital requirements were limited to the
cost of certain improvements. Those were funded by the wives from
their own funds, except for a small short-term loan from the taxpayer.
On the other hand, the officers of Plainridge were Mr. Nelson as presi-
dent, Mrs. Nelson as vice-president, and Mr. Marshall as secretary
treasurer.
b. Control in Summary Fashion
There are several decisions, generally of more recent vintage, that
treat the immediate family as a unit without much discussion. One
commentator has discounted the current vitality of the earlier tax-
payer-favorable decisions, including John L. Denning & Co. and A. G.
Nelson Paper Co., noting that "[m]ore recent decisions . . .have
looked to the reality of control rather than technical legal owner-
ship." '217 In Central Bank of the South v. United States,21 for example,
section 482 was applied to a lease of equipment by a husband to a
215 Id. at 290. This was an unfortunate comment in light of the strong facts suggesting that
Mrs. Denning was truly independent in her new business venture.
216 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 44 (1944).
217 Fuller, supra note 75, at 481. In referring to the outdated law in this area, the author cited
A.G. Nelson Paper Co. and John L. Denning Co. discussed in supra text accompanying notes
213-16. Id. at 481 n.35. The controlled foreign corporation cases discussed earlier also provide
an analogy, because they look to the activism and self-interest of the outside shareholders and
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partnership owned one-half by his wife and one-fourth each by their
children. 19 The court did not discuss the basis of control because it
was conceded in the district court and appellate court proceedings.22 0
In Davis v. Commissioner2 1 a physician established an x-ray serv-
ices corporation and a physical therapy services corporation and gifted
ninety percent of the stock to his minor children, retaining ten percent
for himself. The dividends from the stock were deposited in savings
accounts for the children, and none were used to satisfy support obli-
gations of the father. Inasmuch as the children were minors, and the
parents were divorced, guardians were appointed, but the identities of
the guardians were not reported. The father served as the president
of both corporations. In a footnote, the Tax Court tersely concluded
without discussion that "we find reality of control obvious. 22
In Bluefeld Caterer, Inc. v. Commissioner=3 the Tax Court found
another clear section 482 control case. Two corporations were in
question. In the first corporation, two brothers and their wives each
owned fifty percent of the stock. In the other corporation, the two
brothers each owned fifty percent. The two brothers served as direc-
tors of both corporations, with one or two other individuals, and as
the president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer of each. One
might argue that although the husbands controlled the second corpo-
ration, it is not clear that was the case with the first. On the face of it,
if the shares were split one-fourth each, they were in a deadlock posi-
tion with their wives.224 On the other hand, one could focus on the
common day-to-day control, as evidenced by the overlapping director
assume control by the other shareholders in the face of passivity. See supra text accompanying
notes 146-55 & 172-84.
218 646 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ala. 1986), rev'd, 834 F. 2d 990 (11th Cir. 1987).
219 Neither the lower nor appellate court indicated if the children were emancipated adults.
It appears that the daughter, Jane Cain, was married to Larry Cain, referred to as the son-in-law
of the parents.
220 "It is not contested that the parties to the subject lease were 'controlled parties.'" 646 F.
Supp. at 641 (N.D. Ala. 1986). "Appellees concede that the parties to this equipment lease are
controlled parties." 834 F. 2d at 992.
221 64 T.C. 1034 (1975).
222 Id. at 1045 n.4.
223 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 315 (1969).
224 It appears from the court's description that the stock was held jointly by each married
couple. In that event, one would need to refer to the bylaws or governing corporate law to
determine their relative rights to vote the stock. Under the Delaware corporation law, for exam-
ple, among joint tenants, "if only one votes, his act binds all.... If more than one vote, the act of
the majority so voting binds all.... If more than one vote, but the vote is evenly split on any
particular matter, each faction may vote the securities in question proportionally." General
Corp. Law of Delaware § 217(b), Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 217(b) (1974). One would have ex-
pected some discussion of this by the Tax Court.
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and officer positions.22 The Tax Court did not engage in extended
analysis and considered the two corporations to have sufficient ties to
one another to constitute entities under common control. There are
other decisions that are equally summary in their analysis of this
issue.2 26
An approach, perhaps one followed but not articulated clearly by
the courts, would be an application of the common objective princi-
ples discussed in the following paragraphs.
c. Control Through Common Objective
Other decisions reach the same result as those discussed immedi-
ately above, but base them on the family members acting in concert,
for a common goal, apart from family loyalties. 7 This principle of
the driving common design produced a chain of three controlled enti-
228ties in South Texas Rice Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, which ex-
tended beyond a simple aggregation of family interests in each entity.
The members of four families held identical shareholdings in two cor-
porations. Those shareholders formed a new partnership to engage in
the iice drying business, excluding, however, two brothers who to-
gether owned thirty-five percent of each of the corporations. The tax-
payers argued that the corporations and the partnership were not
under the control of the same interests because the partners owned
only sixty-five percent of each corporation, and the transaction in
question, a lease, required the affirmative vote of shareholders hold-
ing at least eighty percent of the voting power of the corporations.
The Tax Court found that control in fact was exercised. Although the
excluded individuals owned no interests in the partnership, the two
225 In the absence of shareholder voting agreements or other modifications of corporate gov-
erance, such positions could be considered transitory if not founded on ultimate shareholder
control. However, permanence of control appears not to be a requirement. See supra text ac-
companying notes 69-76. In the controlled foreign corporation regulations and case law, the
legal enforceability of control is not required. See supra note 124.
226 See. e.g., Engineering Sales, Inc. v. United States, 510 F. 2d 565 (5th Cir. 1975) (corporation
100 percent owned by parents and corporation 99.6 percent owned by children conceded by
taxpayers to be under common control); Friedlander Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 70 (1955)
(aggregated the varying interests of husband, wife, and children to find overall control).
227 There are, of course, a number of cases that ignore transactions by family members when
requisite facts are present to support attacks couched in terms of sham or mere agency. See, e.g.,
Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F. 2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972) (husband treated as
constructive owner of wife's stock because "surrounding circumstances clearly demonstrate[d]
that [the husband] completely controlled the shares held by [the wife]." 462 F.2d at 722. Com-
pare, Cole v. Helbrun, 4 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. Ky. 1933) (son's purchases of stock on the advice of
father not treated as purchase by father for purposes of wash sale provisions).
228 43 T.C. 540 (1965).
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corporations, which provided rice for processing by the partnership,
and the partnership were an interdependent business operation that
required the cooperation of all parties. The identities of the particular
shareholders might have changed, but the overall control of the family
enterprise did not change, although the court did in passing place
some weight on the blood ties of the participants.
[T]hat common control... exists is shown not only by the relationship of
father and child with respect to the stockholders.., who permitted their
family interest in the partnership to be taken over by their children but
also by the fact that the entire operations of [the partnership] were de-
pendent on the overall family interests in various business entities....
The facts here show that [the two brothers] merely permitted their chil-
dren to take their respective portions of the drying, cleaning, and ware-
housing operations of the entire related businesses, but that in so doing
they in no way changed the actualities of the overall control of the vari-
ous family enterprises.
229
The result in South Texas Rice Warehouse Co. is an example of a
common objective producing a unified family control group. It is also
noteworthy because it demonstrates that the judicial doctrine operates
beyond merely aggregating family interests held in each entity, and
section 482 control cannot be avoided by simply scrambling ownership
interests such that overlapping interests do not exist across putative
controlled entities.23 0 The business synergy argument demonstrated
in the case could be used in analyzing keiretsu relations, but in the
latter context the facts will probably not be so clear or confined.
2. Siblings and Other Family Members
The decision in Robert M. Brittingham v. Commissioner
231
presents a fact situation of family businesses operated by two brothers
with international taxation overtones. One brother, Juan, together
229 43 T.C. at 562.
230 The doctrine that identical owners are not required had been followed by the Tax Court
on several earlier occasions, most notably in Grenada Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.
231 (1951).
231 66 T.C. 373 (1976), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1979). A companion case involved the
corporation that was the subject of Brittingham. After the district court found ownership or
control by the same interests, the case was reversed and remanded by the same appellate panel
of judges, citing at length from the pro-taxpayer result in Brittingham. See Dallas Ceramic Com-
pany v. United States, 74-2 USTC 9830 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd & rem'd, 598 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir.
1979). An interesting fact in these cases was that the taxpayers claimed a different price for
customs valuation that was lower than the invoice price between the corporations. That did not
affect the transfer pricing tax issue. Under a provision enacted after the years in question, if it is
established that imported goods are transferred among related parties (as defined in section 482)
the costs of goods in the hands of the purchaser can not exceed the customs value. See I.R.C.
§ 1059A (1988).
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with his wife, mother, and several nominal shareholders owned a
Mexican corporation, Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A., that produced
ceramic tiles. Juan, his wife, and three daughters owned thirty-seven
percent of Dallas Ceramic Corporation, a Texas corporation also in-
volved in the ceramics business. Juan's brother Robert and his two
sons also owned thirty-seven percent of the stock of the latter corpo-
ration, and the balance of the stock was owned by uncles, an aunt, and
cousins of Juan and Robert. The Tax Court declined to apply section
482 to sales of tile between the two corporations, because the stake of
Juan and his immediate family in Dallas Ceramic Corporation was not
enough alone to permit exercise of control over the business policies
of the corporation. The court also rejected the government's argu-
ment that there was a common design to shift income that would en-
large the potential control group to include Juan, Robert, and their
mother (whose shares were controlled by Juan under a power of attor-
ney). The court was satisfied that, any sibling affection notwithstand-
ing, the ownership stakes by each brother were sufficiently disparate
to create conflicting self-interests in the dealings between the two
corporations.
To believe that Robert would be a part of a plan to divert $1.5 million
from a corporation in which he and his children owned a 37-percent in-
terest to a corporation in which his immediate family had no interest
strains all credulity.... Their fraternal relationship alone is not sufficient
to infer that there existed any plan to shift income between them.23 2
In this decision, the brothers had clearly adverse interests. It is
distinguishable from cases where family members have a common de-
sign. It is also distinguishable from those cases involving members of
the immediate family where individual family members are presumed
to lack conflicting interests and are considered as dominated by other
members, particularly those with day-to-day management control of
the enterprise.
3. Related Trusts and Estates
There are several decisions in which the courts included stock
owned by estates or trusts for the benefit of family members.233 In
232 66 T.C. at 398-99.
233 One inquiry should be whether the trustee is an independent trustee, or a family member
or similarly situated person subject to influence. This, of course, raises the issue of the role of
fiduciary obligations in negativing control for section 482 purposes. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 127-38. There was no discussion of this point nor the pertinent facts, like the trustee's
obligations, in one case presenting this issue. That is not surprising because section 482 was
found inapplicable under the facts and circumstances of the parties' dealings. See Diefenthal v.
United States, 367 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. La. 1973) (stock held by testamentary trusts under grandfa-
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Sunshine Department Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner,34' for example, the
court had little trouble aggregating the interests in several entities
owned by an estate with those owned by the fiduciaries and
beneficiaries. z35
IV. CHANGING THE STANDARDS OF CONTROL
The statutory requirements of "ownership" or "control" play a
role in establishing the boundaries of the economic enterprise. Con-
ceptually, they serve to delineate where the enterprise under common
control ends and the market's pricing mechanism begins. That gen-
eral issue, of course, has been the topic of this article. The refined
question is whether the prevailing concepts of control are appropriate.
A. Some Alternatives
The existing statute defining control in section 482 is obviously,
and probably intentionally, vague. Some commentators have noted
the flexibility that offers the government in applying a section aimed
at tax evasion.236 In the interest of coherence, one might seek to coor-
dinate the control provisions of section 482 with those of other kin-
dred sections, for example, section 957.7 Although section 957,
ther's will for the benefit of grandsons, but for which the father was trustee, considered to be a
control stake held by the father, but section 482 ultimately found inapplicable on other grounds).
Compare Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325, for estate taxation purposes attributes the powers of
an otherwise independent trustee to a person who has the right to remove and replace the
trustee without cause. But see Estate of Helen S. Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. No. 21 (1993)
(declining to apply Revenue Ruling 79-353).
234 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1379 (1981).
235 See also Cadillac Textiles Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 295 (1975) (interests
held by their children and grandchildren through trusts were aggregated with the interests held
by two brothers in finding common control); Compare Rev. Rul. 81-233, 1981-2 C.B. 83 (for
purposes of section 302(c), custodianship under Uniform Gifts to Minors Act was a tainted inter-
est); Rev. Rul. 71-426, 1971-2 C.B. 173 (trustee of voting trust held tainted interest for purposes
of section 302(c)). The analogy, however, to section 302(c) is not strong because of the different
objectives of the sections. See supra note 83.
236 "Section 482 is not weighted down with mechanical percentage tests as are other Code
sections, such as sections 542, 552 and 957, and thus can be applied much more flexibly." Fuller,
supra note 75, at 483. "Section 482 is left intentionally vague in order to allow flexibility of
administration." William T. Plumb, Jr. & Robert H. Kapp, Reallocation of Income and Deduc-
tions Under Section 482, 41 TAXEs 809, 811 (1963).
237 See, e.g., Coven, supra note 36; Fred M. Ringel et al., Attribution of Stock Ownership in the
Internal Revenue Code, 72 HAv. L. REv. 209 (1958); Thomas J. Reily, An Approach to the
Simplification and Standardization of the Concepts 'The Family,' 'Related Parties,' 'Control,' and
'Attribution of Ownership,' 15 TAX L. REv. 253 (1960). "It is believed that the usual conception
of control as well as uniformity would be served if the definition under section 304(c) was ap-
plied uniformly throughout the Code in determining control." Id. at 269. "'Control' should also
have a uniform concept, with a stock ownership of 50 percent constituting control," Id. at 276
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 15:1 (1994)
determining controlled foreign corporation status, is a critical factor in
the structuring of outbound transactions by United States persons, it
does not affect the inbound transactions that are one of the emerging
areas of interest in section 482. In that regard, a more lenient stan-
dard for outbound, as opposed to inbound, transactions would un-
doubtedly be unacceptable to the international trading partners of the
United States238 In addition, although section 482 definitely has an
international role, one cannot overlook its continuing role in purely
domestic transactions. One could still argue that to facilitate out-
bound transactions, if that should be a goal,239 the standard must be at
least as clear as that in section 957. Perhaps, but this area is appar-
ently more sensitive to controlled foreign corporation and foreign tax
credit planning anyway.240 Moreover, if it is a reality of international
taxation diplomacy that transfer pricing standards cannot discriminate
between inbound and outbound transactions, a more taxpayer-
friendly standard may be less appealing as a domestic political matter
if it comes with the price of also aiding foreign taxpayers. Recent his-
tory would not suggest that significant liberalization of transfer pricing
restrictions is a legislative interest.241
Putting aside the issue of whether the overall balance of the sec-
tion should be tilted in a given direction, the language of the provision
might be improved. "Control" is used in numerous contexts outside
of the tax law, notably in securities regulation,24 2 lender liability243
(however, the author does not deal with section 482 so that conclusion was probably not in-
tended so broadly).
238 Aside from the international diplomacy issues, the inbound investments could be through
United States corporate subsidiaries. A different standard based on the foreign ownership
would also violate the non-discrimination terms of many treaties. See, e.g., U.S. Treasury, 1981
Model Treaty, Article 24, 1 5 (June 16, 1981), reprinted in see. 211 Tax Treaties (CCH) 10573,
10,583 (1981).
239 It is beyond the scope of this article to enter, or even attempt to adequately describe, the
political and economic policy debate over appropraite United States government responses to
foreign investment by United States persons abroad, on the one hand, and United States invest-
ment by foreign persons, on the other. The United States system overall aims to be neutral, but
the exceptions and competing cross-currents render that generalization meaningless. For a trea-
tise exploring this subject see HUFBAUER & VAN Roou, supra note 25.
240 See supra text accompanying notes 92-100.
241 The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), contained several provisions which further tightened the taxa-
tion rules for both inbound and outbound transactions. The act reduced the threshold amounts
necessary for treatment of a transfer pricing adjustment as a substantial valuation misstatement
under I.R.C. § 6662. The legislation also introduced a new I.R.C. § 956A which eliminates defer-
ral on certain earnings of a controlled foreign corporation when invested in "excessive passive
assets."
242 See generally Sommer, supra note 70; Joseph W. Bartlett & Philip S. Lapatin, The Status of
a Creditor as a "Controlling Person," 28 MERCER L. REV. 639 (1977).
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and a host of otherwise unrelated federal statutes. 244 Because section
482 permits the Service to ignore the separate identity of corporate
entities, one might also draw from state law and taxation themes that
seek that result for other purposes, like piercing the corporate veil. 45
In that regard, one finds approaches such as the unitary business, inte-
grated enterprise, and enterprise doctrines.246 These alternative ap-
proaches can be dispatched for the most part, because they are drawn
from contexts that are dissimilar in purpose, they use set formulae for
finding "relatedness" that may be too easily avoided in the context of
section 482 and its purposes,247 or they are as equally vague and plia-
ble as the existing standard. This is not to say that there are no useful
expressions of control standards among the many formulations. The
American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, for example,
offers a definition of control.
[Control is] the power, directly or indirectly, either alone or pursuant to
an arrangement or understanding with one or more other persons, to
exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of a
business organization, through the ownership of or power to vote equity
243 See generally Jeffrey John Hass, Insights Into Lender Liability: An Argument for Treating
Controlling Creditors as Controlling Shareholders, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1321 (1987).
244 Control is a factor in applying a number of federal laws, including the Securities Act of
1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Interstate Commerce Act, Federal Power Act, Federal
Communications Act of 1934, Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935, Investment Company Act of 1940, Transportation Act of 1940, and Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act. See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an
Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL J. CORP. L. 283, 325-45 (1990).
245 In considering whether to pierce the corporate veil and hold a parent corporation liable,
the courts have in many cases required more than a finding of control. Other factors such as
domination and the "excessive" exercise of control are required. See generally PHILLIP I.
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORTE GROUPS §§ 6.02, 10.02, 19.02 & 20.02 (1987). "Lifting"
the corporate veil is a consideration in international law. For example, courts have been faced
with determining the nationality of corporations in time of war in the application of "trading
with the enemy" legislation. See generally IoNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, COR.PORATIONS IN
AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 8-9 (1987). "Control" over documents has been an issue in
the international production of documents for purposes of discovery. See WALLACE, supra note
6, at 154-69.
246 Blumberg, supra note 244, at 345-75.
247 Professor Blumberg did not suggest changing the pliable language of section 482 as inter-
preted in the regulations, "[a]voiding reliance on any precise mathematical test that could serve
as a blueprint for evasion." Blumberg, supra note 244, at 334. The unitary business doctrine of
course is the basis for a formulary apportionment of state and international business taxable
income. Rather than refining "control" for purposes of section 482, it would seek to avoid the
immediate problem altogether. See generally Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the
Myth of Arm's Length, 30 TAX NOTES 625 (Feb. 17,1986); GEOFFREY JOHN HARLEY, INTERNA-
TIONAL DivIsION OF THE INCOME TAX BASE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1981).
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interests, through one or more intermediary persons, by contract, or
otherwise.
248
That definition sounds something like the section 482 regulations, ex-
cept that it expressly limits influence to that obtained through the
power to vote, excluding influence through economic means, such as
control over a unique asset. In that regard, the revenue laws for the
United Kingdom, for example, in similar fashion limit control to that
conferred by share ownership, the articles of association, or other
document.2 4 9
Even if the current standard is to be retained, interpretations of
that standard will continue to evolve in response to new taxpayer de-
velopments, including those in the global business environment. As
demonstrated by the preceding material, the judicial trend has been a
more expansive interpretation of the control requirement. Although
the courts have not been reluctant to finely examine the almost infi-
nite variations in the ownership related control structures of enter-
prises, little precedent exists concerning control through practical or
economic means. The latter issue is addressed in the materials below.
B. Control and the Boundaries of the Firm
Multinational enterprises in part engage in transactions with their
affiliates because it is more efficient for them than resorting to market
transactions.25 ° Professor Coase proposed that individuals create
"firms" because some costs of using the price mechanism can be
248 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 1.08(a)
(Proposed Fimal Draft Mar. 31, 1992). Under this definition control can spring only through the
ownership of or power to vote equity interests. For this purpose an equity interest includes an
interest that is convertible into such an interest. Id. § 1.20. A person is not in control solely
because of status as a director or principal manager. Id. § 1.08(c). Control is expressed in terms
of influencing managemept or policies of the corporation, and transfer pricing decisions would
be included under the management role. The American Law Institute proposal has other facets.
A person who owns or has the power to vote more than twenty-five percent of the equity inter-
ests is presumed to be in control unless some other person owns or has the power to vote a
greater percentage of equity interests. Id. § 1.08(b). An in concert concept is used in section
1.09, which defines a "control group" as a group of persons who act in concert to exercise a
controlling influence pursuant to an arrangement or understanding with each other. This re-
quirement of an understanding is narrower than the standard applied by the court in Forman,
supra note 102. Compare California General Corporation Law § 160(a), Cal. Corp. Code
§ 160(a) West 1990) ('1... '[C]ontrol' means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to
direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a corporation").
249 Paul D. Hunston & Michael W. Turner, International Taxation and the Great Transfer Pric-
ing Debate: The Position Adopted on the Other Side of the Atlantic, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 691,
694-96 (1991).
250 See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
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thereby avoided.25 1 For him the boundaries of the firm are defined by
whether the entrepreneur has the power to direct the activities of the
party in question, but "it is not possible to draw a hard and fast line
which determines whether there is a firm or not." '252 Professor Coase
later suggests that the direction factor resembles the degree of direc-
tion that, as a matter of law, produces the relationship of master and
servant, employer and employee.25 3
This analysis at first does not seem particularly relevant in com-
paring the boundaries of the "firm" to the parties' relatedness for sec-
tion 482 purposes. However, in building on the work of the
economists Cowling and Sugden,25 4 one writer has suggested that the
concept of the firm be expanded to include operations controlled by
the enterprise but outside the boundaries of the legal firm.
For example, through sub-contracting the principal can exercise a con-
siderable amount of control over the sub-contractor. Sub-contracting is
one of the various ways in which a large corporation can become in-
volved in the coordination of production and can exercise some control
over another "firm" without the existence of equity participation.... As
the network of joint ventures, alliances, licensing agreements and sub-
contracting arrangements widens, the need to consider the corporation
in terms of control over assets and production rather than in terms of
ownership also grows.255
251 "[T]he operation of a market costs something and, .... by forming an organization and
allowing some authority ... to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved." R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, reprinted in THE FiRm THE MARKET AND THE LAW 33,40 (1988).
252 Id. at 40 n.21. Professor Coase uses the example of a contract with a supplier where the
service to be provided is expressed in general terms, with details to be supplied at a later date.
The contract states only the limits of what the supplier is expected to do, and the details of what
the supplier is expected to do are not stated in the contract but are to be decided by the pur-
chaser. "When the direction of resources (within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent
on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a 'firm' may be obtained." Id. at 40.
253 See generally Coase, supra note 251, at 53-55. Years later Professor Coase admitted that
the employer-employee example was a weakness of his 1937 article, because the firm will have
control over other factors of production, like property, as well as labor. See generally R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, reprinted in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 61, 64-65
(Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991).
254 See Keith Cowling & Roger Sugden, Market Exchange and the Concept of a Transnational
Corporation: Analysing the Nature of the Firm, 9 B=rr. REv. OF ECON. IssuEs 57 (1987) (key to
the existence of the "firm" is that production is coordinated and controlled from one center of
strategic decision making, although some of the relationships might involve market exchanges
through, for example, subcontracting).
255 IETro-GILLIES, supra note 7, at 13. "Many long-term contractual relationships (such as
franchising) blur the line between the market and the firm. It may be more useful to merely
examine the economic rationale for different types of particular contractual relationships in par-
ticular situations, and consider the firm as a particular kind or set of interrelated contracts."
Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 326 (1978).
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Control exercised through contractual arrangements, short of equity
ownership, has been noted by a number of other writers25 6 and such
non-equity relationships are found in many international business ar-
rangements that are growing in popularity.
25 7
In a notable controlled foreign corporation decision, Estate of
Weiskopf v. Commissioner,25 8 the Tax Court included in its list of con-
trol factors the shareholders' power to terminate supplies of a proprie-
tary technical good. "Since Ininco had no contract with Limited
assuring it of any supply beyond current orders, the use of Ininco as
an exporting business could have been halted at any time by a firm
over which [the shareholders in question] had control. ' 259 This was
only one factor in the context of corporations in which the United
States party already held a fifty percent equity stake; it should not be
confused with an arm's length relationship. Still, the United States
party in Estate of Weiskopf undeniably held influence over the enter-
prise beyond its equity stake. This aspect, the compulsion and influ-
ence, is considered below.
C. Examining Freedom of Action
Essentially, section 482 is a valuation provision, which seeks to
place a fair market valuation on transactions considered as outside the
market mechanism because they are between controlled or related ac-
tors. In a wealth transfer taxation context, "fair market value" is de-
fined as "the price at which the property would change hands between
a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compul-
sion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of rele-
vant facts. 260 The degree of "compulsion" is key to the definition.
One might argue that a person is not "compelled" to enter into a dis-
advantageous transaction; there is the alternative of simply foregoing
256 In addressing the special case of the international hotel industry, one commentator has
noted that a very high degree of control can be exerted over the local hotel operation through
the management contract, which can have an initial term of fifteen to twenty years. De jure
control is not necessary in part because there is little intra-group trade that needs to be coordi-
nated and the objectives of the multinational are generally shared by the host country licensee.
See DUNNrNG, supra note 15, at 260-61.
257 See supra text accompanying notes 11-21.
258 64 T.C. 78 (1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1976).
259 Id. at 95.
260 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1993). The regulations dealing with foreign ownership of real
estate add "unrelated" to essentially the same definition of fair market value. "Gross value is
the price at which the property would change hands between an unrelated buyer and willing
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge
of all relevant facts." Treas. Reg. § 1.897-1(o)(2)(ii) (1988).
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the opportunity. On the other hand, that view treats business rela-
tionships as static, or consisting of only a single negotiated transaction
in which the decision is a simple "up or down." It is not unrealistic to
assume that the dynamics of business relationships can shift once the
parties are committed so that a degree of compulsion is introduced.
In that manner, one might expand the concept of control for purposes
of 482 to include situations where one of the parties cannot freely bar-
gain, even if temporarily, in the absence of traditional forms of equity-
based control.261
A recurring theme in discussions of Professor Coase's work is the
long-term contract's role in limiting opportunistic behavior by parties
to a contract produced by so-called "asset specificity." Asset specific-
ity would arise where "a firm, in order to supply another firm, has to
make investments which have little value to it except in its role as
supplier to that purchaser. 26 2  The hold-up potential is obvious; once
the supplier has made the investments,2 63 the purchaser has a bargain-
ing advantage. The converse situation can arise, on the other hand, if
the purchaser relies solely on one supplier for a good that cannot be
readily obtained elsewhere.264  Professor Coase suggests that long-
term contracts can be utilized to limit hold-up tactics, and in that re-
261 In classifying international cooperative arrangements one writer has referred to so-called
"interfirm cooperative arrangements" as referring to any form of long-term cooperation be-
tween firms. He includes within this term long-term supply contracts, a distributor agreement, as
well as a manufacturing joint venture. Root, supra note 19, at 69. The writer suggested that
additional control over the cooperative arrangement can be obtained through ownership, by
creating an equity joint venture or by increasing one's equity share, or through enhanced bar-
gaining power, by making the arrangement more dependent on the availability of the firm's
proprietary resources such as technology or market entry so that it would be "costly or impossi-
ble for other partners to replace." Id. at 76. The Treasury Regulations themselves at least sug-
gest that transactions that are arm's length on the surface give rise to "[a] presumption of control
... if income or deductions have been arbitrarily shifted." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-T(g)(4) (1993).
262 Coase, supra note 253, at 69.
263 The investment could be in a tailored, highly immobile, site, the acquisition of specialized
equipment and machinery, investments in specialized human capital created through a "learn-
ing-by-doing" process, or general investments by the supplier made because of the prospect of
selling a significant amount of product to the purchaser. See generally Paul L. Joskow, Asset
Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence, in THm NATURE Op
Ta FItm, supra note 253, 117, at 126.
264 This naked power could be subject to other legal constraints, if applicable after consider-
ing the international context, such as the requirement of good faith dealings among partners or
the Uniform Commercial Code requirement of good faith in so-called "output" and "require-
ments" contracts. See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1990). See generally Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369 (1980). See also
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corporation, 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533 (1971) (finding
economic duress and business compulsion in a price increase demanded by the supplier of goods
under a continuing contract where the goods could not be obtained elsewhere).
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gard, he offers the example of the A.O. Smith Company which pro-
duced automobile frames, almost exclusively, for General Motors for
more than fifty years? 65 He points to the enduring nature of the rela-
tionship under the contract, in spite of the fact that several key terms
were left open for subsequent negotiation.266
Other economists have disagreed with Professor Coase's view of
long-term contracts as a solution to the hold-up problem. "Due to
uncertainty and the difficulty of specifying all elements of perform-
ance in a contractually enforceable way, contracts will necessarily be
incomplete to one degree or another. This creates the possibility for
transactors to take advantage of the contract to hold up their con-
tracting partner. 26
7
Under this view the parties to a long-term contract cannot predict
all of the situations that might occur, so future openings for opportu-
nistic behavior are inevitably presented. In the context of an interna-
tional joint venture or other affiliation, the United States party would
not necessarily be dominant. Although the United States party could
be providing technology, other intangibles, or capital and could
thereby throttle the venture if the technology transfer or capital infu-
sion is subject to termination, 268 the United States party might have
already invested significant sums in production infrastructure. More-
over, if the host country participant was chosen for political or busi-
ness influence, that ultimately could be the most irreplaceable
contribution to the venture, producing more leverage to the party
wielding that power.
269
265 See generally Coase, supra note 253, at 71-72.
266 For example, prices were set by annual negotiations, subject to changes for modifications
in design or changes in costs. Coase, supra note 253, at 72. If the parties are otherwise under
common control, the appraisal of who ultimately bears certain economic risks of a business
transaction is also pertinent to the determination of the appropriate transfer price in several
contexts. See, eg., Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(c)(3) (1993) (evaluation of risk bearing in determining
comparability); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1A82-2(g), 57 Fed. Reg. 3751 (Jan. 30, 1992) (sharing of risks
in research and development cost sharing arrangements).
267 Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-Gen-
eral Motors Relationship Revisited, in THm NATURE OF Ta FiRM, supra note 253, 213, at 215.
268 "For example, the fact the General Motors of Canada is technologically dependent on its
United States parent means that even were it to become 100 percent-owned by Canadian inter-
ests, it would still be dependent on the parent to provide the technical assistance necessary for its
survival. Again, the stock ownership in such cases has little relevance as a controlling influence,
the real control residing at the source of the vital technical assistance." WALLACE, supra note 6,
at 75.
269 Obviously, the underlying circumstances of specific joint ventures will vary. Some joint
ventures will be among equals, among the largest corporations. One writer has termed this as
the "global core business venture." Koot, supra note 141, at 348. Other ventures will be by large
corporations expanding in non-industrialized countries. This has been categorized as the "LDC-
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The facts in Estate of Weiskopf suggest that the United States
company held hold-up power over the venture through its power to
terminate the license of the business intangibles. In addition,
although the broader issue before the court was whether the foreign
subsidiary was a controlled foreign corporation, not a section 482 is-
sue, the determinative factor was the presence of control. The licens-
ing agreement was only one of several factors producing control, so a
high degree of "relatedness" already existed. Nevertheless, the result
could be applied to find control under section 482 in similar circum-
stances, for example, where the United States party is a fifty-fifty co-
venturer with a foreign party.
D. Application to Purely Contractual Relationships
Although the United States shareholder in Estate of Weiskopf
owned an equity interest in the firm, the result might be applied to
strictly contractual relationships. Short-term relationships, or occa-
sional transactions, do not involve the same degree of compulsion, be-
yond the "take it, or leave it" exchanges in the marketplace and
should be excluded. This is not a surprising conclusion. The purpose
of section 482 is to prevent tax avoidance, not to enforce fairness in
dealings. Tax avoidance is difficult to find when an otherwise unre-
lated taxpayer gets an unusually good or bad deal, from an economic
perspective, and another taxpayer enjoys the converse of that situa-
tion.270 An unstated basis for section 482 allocations is perhaps the
sense that in dealing with related or controlled taxpayers, an incorrect
or abusive transfer price now will be "made up" in the future by some
future accommodation from the other party, the ultimate receipt of
which is assured by the relatedness or control.271
A long-term contractual relationship, even without equity as-
pects, is closer to the facts of Estate of Weiskopf and can present some
of the "hold-up" opportunities discussed earlier. The relationship due
to its duration and greater degree of financial commitment can pro-
joint venture" and "[r]elative inequality of northern and southern partners are a fact of life
here." Id. The third type of joint venture is the "continental partnership" which accounted for
90 percent of the writer's data. With this type of venture "[b]ig, middle-sized, or even small
businesses take an option for a capital partner in another industrialized country, with the aim of
'conquering a continent' for their capital or product." Id. at 349.
270 With regard to the United States fisc, if United States companies were to consistently
negotiate better deals than their foreign counterparts, it seems that such discrepancies would
lead to even more enhanced revenues.
271 However, Professors Bittker and Eustice have observed that direct pecuniary benefit from
an improper allocation is not a prerequisite to application of section 482. See supra note 59.
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duce greater dynamics in a continuing give and take. There does not
appear to be a meaningful difference between ownership rights, under
an equity arrangement, and rights provided through contractual alli-
ances.2 72 Both situations present the opportunity for transfer pricing
flexibility which is recouped in other facets of the overall arrange-
ment. With the exception of Estate of Weiskopf, there is little judicial
precedent and no legislative authority supporting an economic view of
control. As with much of the gloss placed on section 482, the Treasury
would need to take the lead in its regulations and other administrative
pronouncements. In at least one international tax provision, the
Treasury has acknowledged that economic factors can produce con-
trol, but it has apparently limited that application to such factors in
conjunction with an ownership interest.
a73
Contractual alliances among near equals would not demonstrate
the same degrees of compulsion.2 74  However, smaller contractors
with long-term relationships could be subject to these pressures. That
272 Some economists contrast the rights one has in an enterprise as an owner, as compared
with a contractor, on the basis of the "residual rights of control." See generally Oliver D. Hart,
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE Fii i, supra note 253,
138, at 140-54. Generally speaking, most contracts will be incomplete as to some term, and one
of the parties will not be required to act with respect to that term, and therefore has a residual
right of control over that term, but over nothing else. In an ownership situation, one has residual
rights of control over those factors with respect to an asset or enterprise that exceed those claims
of non-owners such as creditors and other parties to a contract that applies to the asset or enter-
prise. "Of course, control or ownership is never absolute .... However, ownership gives the
owner all rights to use the [asset] that he has not voluntarily given away or that the government
or some other party has not taken by force.... [T]he owner of an asset has the residual rights of
control of that asset, that is, the right to control all aspects of the asset that have not been
explicitly given away by contract." Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Bene-
fits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. PoL ECON. 691, 694-95
(1986). In the case of a very simple case of technology, for example, it is easy to see the greater
"bundle of sticks" retained by the owner and licensor of the technology as compared with those
held by a licensee for a limited term or limited geographical area. The residual rights analysis
does identify some obvious differences between the sole ownership of property and contractual
rights, but they are not overly relevant to this issue. In dealing with the shared ownership of
underlying property through the ownership of intangibles, like partnership or corporate inter-
ests, the relationships are essentially contractual based. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L.
RE,. 1618 (1989).
273 In defining "effective practical control" for purposes of the taxation of controlled commer-
cial entities of foreign governments, the regulations acknowledge that control might be achieved
through "creditor, contractual or regulatory relationships." Treas. Reg. § 1.892-5T(c)(2) (1988).
An example is also given of "a substantial creditor of the entity or [control of] a strategic natural
resource which such entity uses in the conduct of its trade or business." Id. The regulation, in
each case, notes that such practical control is in conjunction with an ownership interest. How-
ever, the statute provides an ownership test and an alternate control test, the latter not requiring
any ownership stake on its face. See I.R.C. § 892(a)(2)(B) (1988).
274 See supra note 269.
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typically was the situation of the lower tier subcontractors in the verti-
cal keiretsu.27 5 In the vertical keiretsu many lower-level subcontrac-
tors were reportedly forced into financial ruin by the "Yen shock"
economic pressures that percolated down to their level from the upper
tiers. 6 The economic concessions demanded by the parent compa-
nies were so great that many of the subcontractors could not survive.
This arguably demonstrated that the long-term reciprocal benefit rela-
tionship, under stress, was reduced to the predictable arm's length sur-
vival conduct of the marketplace of everyone for themselves. "The
parent companies that once supported them in good times or bad can
no longer afford to do that. The social contract has been broken....
If the parent firm can no longer give them enough work, the market
principle will take over. 277
One could argue that it is improper to evaluate the relationship in
terms of an extreme case, ultimate disassociation upon insolvency,
rather than according to its normal operating pattern. Even parent
companies could permit wholly-owned subsidiaries to fail; that possi-
bility does not negate the non-arm's length nature of the relationship
that previously existed.278 On the other hand, with a parent and sub-
sidiary relationship it is clear who bears the risk of interim profit or
loss, or ultimate failure; it is the parent. In a subcontractor relation-
ship, on the other hand, in an absolute failure it would seem that
through the contract all or a portion of the ultimate loss of capital
would be shifted onto the subcontractor. Although that response is
intuitively appealing, section 482 control principles do not neatly fall
along the lines of which party bears the ultimate risk of loss, or pre-
ponderance of the loss, 279 because control can be separated from own-
ership or pecuniary gain.8 °
Even if one accepts this interesting premise, the enforcement of
an even broader standard would be difficult to administer. It is partic-
ularly an improbable option in the international environment, since it
275 See supra text accompanying notes 205-09.
276 MIYASHTA & RUSSELL, supra note 192, at 159-60, 199-200.
277 MIYASHITA & RUSSELL, supra note 192, at 201.
278 If marriage created an absolute related party situation one could likewise downplay the
related party aspects in the present due to the possibility of dissolution of the marriage. Of
course, there are a number of important factors, like the degrees of separate wealth, the share of
wealth upon dissolution, etc.
279 In a joint venture, for example, with two parties risking their capital, the control person
under this model would be the party with the most at risk, which would often correlate with
equity ownership and voting.
280 See supra text accompanying notes 54-88.
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requires cooperation among international taxing authorities. 28 1 The
earnest United States interest in transfer pricing abuses has at times
raised concerns with trading partners, particularly when stances con-
sidered as very extreme are assumed by the Treasury. The Treasury's
regulations interpreting section 482, in particular the "commensurate
with the income" intangible pricing provisions, have produced signifi-
cant discontent among other countries. 2  The introduction of a con-
trol standard based on more subtle economic control bases would
probably not be welcomed. On the other hand, as transfer pricing
becomes important to more of the public treasuries of an increasingly
interrelated global business environment, United States positions
could gain wider acceptance.28 3
Several countries have already adopted very broad definitions of
control in their transfer pricing rules. China has reportedly included
in its definition of an "associated enterprise" situations where "the
business operations of an enterprise depend upon franchises, indus-
281 "From the standpoint of section 482, this means that if each taxing jurisdiction picks the
arm's-length standard that maximizes that jurisdiction's tax revenues, double taxation will inevi-
tably be the result.... In this context, therefore, it is not tax avoidance, but double taxation, that
is at issue, and this, presumably, is exactly the appropriate setting for appeal to competent au-
thority involving the tax authorities of both nations." Berry et al., supra note 47, at 737. The
1981 Model Treaty proposed by the Treasury as its starting point in treaty negotiations, provides
for a "Mutual Agreement Procedure" between the so-called "competent authorities" of the two
contracting jurisdictions. Among other things, the two competent authorities can agree "to the
same allocation of income, deductions, credits, or allowances between persons." U.S. Treasury,
1981 Model Treaty, Article 25, 1 3(b)(June 16, 1981), reprinted in sec. 211 Tax Treaties (CCH)
10,573, 10,583 (1981). Cooperation is the key to more long-range solutions, like a formula ap-
portionment approach. See, eg., HUFBAUER & VAN Rooij, supra note 25, at 149-51 (urging
continued cooperation first, in applying Advanced Pricing Agreements among competent au-
thorities and "baseball style" arbitration, as preparation for other measures, like formula
sharing).
282 See, e.g., European Organization Says Transfer Pricing Rules May Obstruct Flow of Goods
and Services, 92 TAx NoTEs INT 'L 31-48 (Jul. 29, 1992); Japanese Exporters Comment on Trans-
fer Pricing Regs., 92 TAX NoTES INT'L 32-36 (Aug. 5, 1992); Transfer Pricing Regs Should Follow
International Standards, Swiss Group Says, 92 TAX NoTEs INT'L 32-32 (Aug. 5, 1992);
GULCNFTC Conference Paper Discussing a German Perspective of the Temporary U.S. Transfer
Pricing Regulations, 93 TAX NoTEs INT'L 51-7 (Mar. 17, 1993); International Chamber of Com-
merce Issues Comments on Temporary 1993 U.S. Transfer Pricing Regulations, 93 TAX NoTs
IN'L 206-18 (Oct. 26, 1993).
283 The United States, for example, was one of the first countries to adopt anti-abuse provi-
sions aimed at controlled foreign corporations, so-called "Subpart F." Industrialized countries
like the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan ultimately followed that lead in adopting
similar systems. The United States also took the lead in the application of the arm's length
standard to international transactions, although the United Kingdom's Inland Revenue depart-
ment has been notably aggressive in dealing with perceived transfer pricing abuses. See generally
Hunston & Turner, supra note 249. Japan has adopted the arm's length standard, but the Japa-
nese view the United States as adopting unilateral measures, without international cooperation,
when considered necessary to protect the tax base. See generally Guttentag, supra note 116.
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trial property rights, or proprietary technology provided by another
enterprise. '28 4  Such relationships also include those "where raw
materials... are controlled or supplied by another enterprise. ' 28 5 Ja-
pan has also adopted affiliation tests that look to the business reality
of control. The Japanese provisions are in part keyed to fifty percent
stock ownership.28 6 However, the Cabinet Order implementing the
legislation includes as potential control situations the presence of
loans or guarantees between corporations in business transactions and
cases where one corporation's business is very dependent on the other
corporation.28 7 The Japanese tax authorities have extended inquiry
into these "special relationships" to the area of interest deductions
and thin capitalization. 88  Aggressive enforcement of the broad lan-
guage will be the crucial test.289
The ultimate product of these developments may not be related
status for purely contractual ties, but the inquiry will surely raise the
level of scrutiny of such points of influence as applied to situations in
which some ownership positions are held. This promises to be a de-
284 PRIcE WATERHOUSE, supra note 15, at 9.
285 PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 15, at 9. The definition also includes situations "[w]here
funds borrowed from or lent to another enterprise are more than 50% of the.. . funds of an
enterprise or where more than 10% of the funds borrowed from or lent to an enterprise is
guaranteed by another enterprise ... [and] [a]ny other associations with mutual benefits
whereby actual control can be exercised over an enterprise's business." Id.
286 A party is related if "[e]ither the foreign corporation has direct or indirect ownership of
the foreign corporation equal to at least 50% of the issued shares or contributed capital, or...
50% or more of the issued shares or contributed capital of both the corporation taxable in Japan
and the foreign corporation are directly or indirectly owned by the same person." Paul Lacy and
Nobuhiro Shirasu, Inter-Company Transfer Pricing, Japan's New Tax Code Puts Burden of Proof
Onto the Taxpayer, Reuter Textline, Int'l Tax Rep't, Sept. 16, 1986, at 5-6, available in
WESTLAW, INT-NEWS file.
287 Id. "Transactional dependence means that a considerable part of the business activities of
either corporation depends on transactions with the other corporation, including a situation in
which either corporation conducts its business based on the industrial property rights or know-
how (which form the basis of its business activities) offered by the other corporation. Financial
dependence means that a considerable part of the funds required for the business activities of
either corporation is procured through borrowings or guarantees from the other corporation."
Guttentag, supra note 116, at 12.
288 The interest deduction of a Japanese company is reportedly limited if it is both foreign
owned and thinly capitalized. "A company is foreign owned if either (1) 50% or more of its
capital is owned, directly or indirectly, by a foreign company or (2) it has a special relationship
... with a foreign company." PRICE WAT-ERHOUSE, 19 Irr'L TAX REv. 9 (May/June 1993). In
finding a special relationship, "[w]hether or not the Japanese company can operate without in-
dustrial property rights.., which are supplied by the foreign company" or if "[m]ore than half of
the directors.., are, in substance, selected by the foreign company" will be factors. Id.
289 After describing the broad Japanese control rules, one commentator noted "[t]he Japa-
nese definition of 'control' appears clearer and somewhat broader than the U.S. definition.
However, in practice, there may not be any substantial difference between the two." Guttentag,
supra note 116, at 12.
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veloping area with the anticipated increase in the number of coopera-
tive arrangements crossing international borders.
V. SUMMARY
In structuring global investments controlled foreign corporation
status has dominated the literature. This article has investigated the
case law interpreting the control requirements of section 482 with a
view toward its application to international business transactions.
Although control for this purpose shares many of the same factors
found in the controlled foreign corporation inquiry, there are some
differences. Because of these differences, it may be possible to struc-
ture transactions that accomplish controlled foreign corporation
objectives, while avoiding section 482 status.
Reflecting a facts and circumstances inquiry, the section 482 con-
trol case law is very pliable and shifting. It is difficult to fashion a
narrower definition of control that will serve the anti-avoidance pur-
poses of section 482. However, with the apparent proliferation of less
than wholly-owned business vehicles, purely contractual, non-equity
business alliances, and the importation of other nontraditional ar-
rangements like the keiretsu, it appears that the control aspects of sec-
tion 482 will demand closer scrutiny in years to come. Resolution of
those issues will, in typical 482 litigation fashion, turn upon often
murky details of relationships and other facts and circumstances. Ad-
ministrability of any standard is, of course, an ever-present concern.
Apart from continued development of fact patterns, the current views
of control will need to be expanded to meet the challenge of the
keiretsu and contractual alliances. The first step will require adminis-
trative action by the Service in that direction. With some notable ex-
ceptions in the Chinese and Japanese laws, that will be an ambitious
step for the international trading partners who have followed the
United States' lead in transfer pricing matters, but generally with less
conviction.
